Macro-financial linkages and the role of unconventional monetary and macroprudential policy by BLUWSTEIN, Kristina
 
 
Macro-Financial Linkages and the Role of 





Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to obtaining the degree of 
Doctor of Economics of the European University Institute 
Florence, 20 December 2017 

 
European University Institute 
Department of Economics 
Macro-Financial Linkages and the Role of Unconventional 










Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to obtaining the degree of 
Doctor of Economics of the European University Institute 
Examining Board 
Prof. Fabio Canova, EUI, Supervisor 
Prof. Evi Pappa, EUI 
Dr. Roberto M. Billi, Sveriges Riksbank 
Prof. Mathias Trabandt, Freie Universität Berlin 
 
© Kristina Bluwstein, 2017 
No part of this thesis may be copied, reproduced or transmitted without prior 















I,	Kristina	Bluwstein,	 certify	 that	 I	 am	the	author	of	 the	work	 “Macro-Financial	 Linkages	
and	the	Role	of	Unconventional	Monetary	and	Macroprudential	Policy”	I	have	presented	
for	examination	for	the	PhD	thesis	at	the	European	University	Institute.	I	also	certify	that	
this	 is	 solely	 my	 own	 original	 work,	 other	 than	 where	 I	 have	 clearly	 indicated,	 in	 this	
declaration	and	in	the	thesis,	that	it	is	the	work	of	others.	
	






















I	 confirm	 that	 chapter	 2	 draws	 upon	 a	 working	 paper	 "Asymmetric	 Macro-Financial	









This thesis investigates the relationship between the macroeconomy and the financial sector. As shown
by the Financial Crisis, large shocks in the financial system can have a significant impact on the real
economy. In response, policy makers have adopted new and unprecedented tools to stabilise financial
markets, e.g. unconventional monetary and macroprudential policies.
The first chapter, joint with Fabio Canova, examines the international spillovers from unconventional
monetary policy measures by the European Central Bank. We use a novel Bayesian mixed-frequency
Structural Vector Autoregressive technique to show how unconventional monetary policy disturbances
can generate important domestic and international fluctuations through real and financial channels.
We find that international spillovers are larger in countries with more advanced financial systems and a
larger share of domestic banks.
The second chapter investigates the asymmetry of macro-financial linkages. Using a Markov-
Switching Vector Autoregressive model, I show that financial booms tend to be less procyclical than
financial busts. To identify the sources of asymmetry, I estimate a non-linear DSGE model with a
heterogeneous banking sector and an occasionally binding borrowing constraint. The model shows that
the borrowers’ balance sheet channel accounts for the asymmetry in macro-financial linkages. I show
that a counter-cyclical macroprudential policy rule can improve welfare.
The third chapter, joint with Julieta Yung, looks at financial stability and the term risk premium.
We develop a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium framework that can account for macroeconomic
and financial moments, given (i) Epstein-Zin preferences, (ii) a heterogeneous banking sector, and
(iii) third-order approximation methods that yield a time-varying term premium. We find that a risk
shock leads to a decrease in output and bank lending. Moreover, an accomodative monetary policy
shock leads to a trade-o  between output growth and financial stability. Our framework suggests that
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This is joint work with Fabio Canova and published as “Beggar-thy-neighbor? The international
e ects of ECB unconventional monetary policy” (2016). International Journal of Central Banking,
Vol.12(3), pp. 69-120.
1.1 Introduction
In recent years there has been an unprecedented use of so-called unconventional monetary
policy (UMP) measures by central banks of advanced economies. These measures have attracted
increasing criticisms from leaders of developing and peripheral countries. Most notably, the
United States’ tapering policy has led to condemnations from Turkey, India, Brazil and South
Africa (Kynge, 2014). In addition, concerns have been voiced that UMP measures could lead
to ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ e ects. Brazilian President Rousse  remarked in 2012: "Quantitative
easing policies (...) have triggered (...) a monetary tsunami, have led to a currency war and
have introduced new and perverse forms of protectionism in the world."
For Europe, where non Euro members are linked to the euro area either through membership
in the European Union or significant trade and financial ties, concerns are widespread that recent
Quantitative Easing (QE) measures could lead to large appreciation pressures, to increased
financial volatility, and to perverse real e ects. For example, Riksbank deputy Governor Per
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Jansonn states that "ECB measures (...) create challenges(...) The plan is to make extensive
purchases of financial assets, equivalent to three times Swedish GDP over a period of just one
year(...) In the event of a more tangible and rapid appreciation of the krona, it will be even more
di cult for the Riksbank to attain an inflation rate in line with the target. " 1
The economic implications of international spillovers are expected to be severe, as
demonstrated by the recent example of Switzerland, who abandon its floor to the Euro in
January 2015 in anticipation of QE measures, and lost about 50 billion Swiss Francs in foreign
exchange holdings over the first half of the year. Thus, for both academic and policy purposes,
it is crucial to understand if these international spillovers exist, to measure the repercussions for
foreign economies, and to design policies which can contain their negative consequences.
This paper sheds light on these issues using an empirical model, which combines slow-moving
monthly macroeconomic variables, weekly monetary policy variables, and fast-moving daily
financial variables. To handle the frequency mismatch we employ a Bayesian mixed-frequency
Vector Autoregressive model. The setup accounts for macroeconomic–financial linkages without
any of the time-aggregation biases, which are present when lower-frequency data are used,
and it enables us to give a structural interpretation to the international spillovers. Such an
interpretation is not possible when only high-frequency data is used.
We focus on three sets of questions. (1) Do European Central Bank (ECB) UMP measures
generate important financial and real spillovers in European countries not adopting the Euro?
If so, does the exchange rate regime play a role? (2) Does the degree of financial integration
matter? In particular, is it true that larger international real co-movements in response to
UMP disturbances occur when financial markets are more integrated? (3) Which channel of
international transmission is operative? What is the relative importance of trade and financial
links?
Many papers have analysed the domestic e ects of UMP measures (see Cecioni et al., 2011c
for a review). For the euro area, there is evidence that they had positive regional output and
inflation e ects (Lenza et al., 2010a; Darracq-Paries and De Santis, 2015), but that real responses
were slower, less significant than those induced by conventional monetary policy measures
(Gambacorta et al., 2014). In addition, high frequency event studies find a reduction in market
spreads (Abbassi and Linzert, 2012; Angelini et al., 2011a; Beirne et al., 2011a), and a fall in
the term premia and government bonds yields following a UMP announcement, especially when
intra-day data are used (see Ghysels et al., 2017).
A number of studies have also began investigating the international consequences of the Fed’s
UMP measures for emerging markets and found that QE caused the US dollar to depreciate,
foreign stock prices to rise, and CDS spreads to decrease (see e.g. Neely, 2015; Chinn, 2013a;
1Minutes of the Monetary Policy Committee meeting of February 11, 2015
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Chen et al., 2012; Fratzscher et al., 2017). Moessner (2015) observes that international e ects
for advanced and emerging countries are similar, while Chen et al. (2012) claims that the impact
in emerging countries is stronger (see also Aizenman et al., 2016). Lim et al. (2014) claims that
at least 5% of financial inflows to the average developing country between 2000 to 2013 are due
to the Fed’s UMP. Passari and Rey (2015) find that financial flows to developed countries may
also be large.
For euro area UMP measures, Boeckx et al. (2017) show that after a liquidity increase, the
countries with less capitalised banks have smaller bank lending and output e ects, while Lo Duca
et al. (2016) find that confidence and asset prices improve. Since the e ects on yields are small,
they conclude that UMP policies have limited international impact. However, because of the
high-frequency nature of the study, macroeconomic spillovers are not investigated. In this paper,
we look at the e ects of ECB UMP measures in a structural framework that considers both
financial and macroeconomic variables. We also examine the pairwise transmission between the
euro area and nine European countries not adopting the Euro. Furthermore, we attempt to
disentangle channels of domestic and international transmission of UMP disturbances.
We find that UMP shocks generate important financial market responses in the euro
area, sizeable macroeconomic fluctuations, and with no major di erence in terms of timing
or persistence relative to conventional monetary policy shocks. Interestingly, while UMP
disturbances induce significant inflation, conventional monetary policy disturbances primarily
a ect output. Thus, a combination of conventional and unconventional measures may help to
better control output and inflation dynamics. Announcement surprises produce financial market
responses, which are similar to those of conventional policy shocks, but output and inflation
e ects are weak.
International spillovers exist but there is considerable cross-country heterogeneity. The
exchange rate regime is not the reason of this heterogeneity. Advanced economies, which tend to
be more financially integrated with the euro area and have a larger share of domestic banks,
have stronger output and inflation dynamics than those in the euro area. The macroeconomic
e ects for financially less developed countries, which have a larger share of foreign banks, are
varied, but output and inflation responses are the opposite of those of advanced economies.
International transmission occurs both via trade (the exchange rate channel) and financial links
(wealth, risk and portfolio rebalancing channels). However, the exchange rate does not seem to
shape the responses of foreign macroeconomic variables to euro area UMP shocks. This is in
contrast to the international transmission of conventional policy shocks, where the exchange
rate is crucial to understand foreign dynamics.
Our investigation has important policy implications. Controlling exchange rate movements
will not prevent non-euro area countries from importing the unconventional monetary policy
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decisions of the ECB (see also Rey, 2015). Since the dynamics of financial flows are crucial and
the presence of global banks in the area is important in determining domestic outcomes (see also
Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2012), measures indirectly restricting financial flows and bank leverage
could be more e ective in insulating small open economies from undesired output and inflation
fluctuations instead. Devereux et al. (2015) provides the theoretical justification for using such
measures.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 gives an overview of the channels through which
UMP measures may induce domestic and international adjustments. Section 3 describes the
estimation methodology, the identification strategy, and the data. Section 4 presents domestic
responses. Section 5 discusses international spillovers. Section 6 investigates why international
macro-financial linkages are heterogeneous. Section 7 examines the robustness of the results.
Conclusions are provided in Section 8. The Appendices present an overview of the unconventional
monetary policy actions by the ECB, the details of the mixed frequency algorithm we use, and
additional results.
1.2 Channels of International Transmission
There is substantial literature that analyses the mechanics of domestic monetary policy
transmission (see e.g. Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2011a). As far as conventional
monetary policy is concerned, the expectation, the exchange rate, and the interest rate channels
have been emphasised (e.g. Russell, 1992). Basic to the idea that monetary policy a ects the
economy is the notion that central bank decisions influence: (a) price level expectations and thus
the domestic aggregate supply via price and wage settings; (b) expectations of future short-term
interest rates, which feed into long-term interest rates. As long-term interest rates matter for
investment and consumption, the domestic aggregate demand is also altered.
Both aggregate demand and aggregate supply e ects could be reinforced, when monetary
policy alters the value of the domestic currency. Exchange rates variations influence the quantity
and the price of imports and exports and thus both the aggregate supply and aggregate demand.
Monetary policy may also tilt the term structure of interest rates and thus consumption and
investment decisions. The interest rate channel is considered the main transmission mechanism
for conventional monetary policy in Europe before the introduction of the Euro (Angeloni, 2012).
When discussing UMP, two other channels become potentially relevant. UMP measures
may alter asset prices if they change the user cost of capital (wealth channel), and they may
reduce uncertainty and financial risk perceptions (confidence channel). The latter purpose of
stabilisation has been heavily emphasised during the recent financial crisis.
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Note: The grey arrow indicates an indirect e ect. The white arrows indicate contemporaneous e ects.
Figure 1.1 depicts the channels of international transmission that are found relevant when
discussing UMP measures. UMP measures may alter the bilateral nominal (real) exchange rate,
which a ects net trade and import prices for the partner country (exchange rate channel). In
turn, these variations a ect foreign prices, production, and consumption. The relative magnitude
of the changes in both foreign inflation and output depends on substitution and income e ects
(Mishkin, 2001).
There has been an increased interest in the financial channels of international transmission
since the onset of the financial crisis. The credit channel comprises the bank lending and the
balance sheet sub-channels. The bank lending channel refers to the e ect that UMP measures
have on bank reserves when the amount of market liquidity changes (recall that banks are the
main financial institutions in the euro area). The balance sheet channel refers to variations in the
net worth of banks (and firms) due to changes in the value of cash flows and collateral. These
two sub-channels alter credit conditions by a ecting both the quantity and quality of loans. In
economies, which are financially integrated, global credit conditions may also be a ected.
UMP measures may change the relative cost of capital. This may have an e ect on the
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relative price of stocks, bonds, houses, and land, which in turn may lead to international
capital flows (wealth channel). Both the wealth and the credit channels feed into financial risk,
investment, and consumption decisions. While these channels are also present when conventional
monetary policy actions are undertaken, unconventional policy, hence an expansion or change in
the composition of the balance sheet of the central banks, activates the portfolio rebalancing
channel (Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2011a). It has been argued that balance sheet
policies may reduce private portfolio’s duration risk (e.g. Bernanke, 2010a; Gagnon et al., 2011a).
Thus, yields on long-term securities should decline with long-term borrowing increasing. As
a consequence, aggregate demand and financial risk should be altered. Besides a duration
(temporal) e ect, the portfolio rebalancing channel could lead to an international (spatial)
rebalancing between UMP and non-UMP countries, as investors seek higher yields or lower risk
(see Passari and Rey, 2015). Finally, the confidence channel influences perceptions of uncertainty
and risk. Changes in liquidity and asset prices may also have an indirect e ect on risk, as they
influence the confidence of investors, and thus investment and consumption decisions.2
Table 1.1: Timeline of ECB Unconventional Monetary Policy Measures
Date Tool Total size
in Bn of Euros
Dec. 2007-ongoing Reciprocal Currency Agreement 271.6
Mar. 2008-May 2010 6-month Long term refinancing operations 66
May–Dec. 2009 12-month Long term refinancing operations 614
Jun. 2009-Jun. 2010 Covered Bond Purchase Programme 45
May 2010-Aug. 2012 Securities Market Programme 195
Aug. 2011 12-month Long term refinancing operations 49.8
Oct. 2011 13-month Long term refinancing operations 57
Nov. 2011-Oct. 2012 Covered Bond Purchase Programme 2 15
Dec. 2011 36-month Long term refinancing operations 489
Feb. 2012 36-month Long term refinancing operations 530
Jul. 2012 Draghi‘s “Whatever it takes speech”
Aug. 2012-ongoing Outright Monetary Transaction
Jul. 2013 Forward Guidance
Source: ECB weekly Financial Statements; ECB Statistical Warehouse; Updated from Cecioni et al.
(2011).
Table 1.1 lists the programs and the timing of ECB unconventional measures during the
sample we consider. A detailed explanation of what each measure involves is in Appendix 1.A.
‘Unorthodox’ policies fell into two broad categories: liquidity policies and sovereign debt policies.
The former were introduced as a reaction to the financial crisis to ease tensions and make the
2While Figure 1.1 is not mentioning the signalling channel, we account for signaling e ects in the next few
sections.
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interbank market function properly. The presumption was that the additional liquidity would
be channelled to private borrowers and that real activity would then pick up. If the additional
liquidity would become available in global markets and if foreign banks were willing to use it to
finance domestic projects, foreign real activity could have also received a boost. The second type
of policies were introduced during the sovereign debt crisis to restore confidence in the Euro, to
lower long-term yields for troubled economies, and restart normal lending practices.
Thus, while ECB unconventional policies could have had a direct e ect on the credit and
the confidence channel of international transmission, they may have only indirectly a ected the
exchange rate and the portfolio of agents, whenever they induced capital flows. In addition, they
could have produced global wealth e ects if, in response to the additional liquidity, the banking
system changed the composition of its portfolio of assets towards more risky activities.
1.3 The Mixed Frequency Methodology
Due to the high-frequency nature of financial variables and the slow reporting of macroeconomic
data, applied economists typically face a frequency mismatch when trying to jointly examine
macro-financial linkages in response to shocks. The most common solution is to aggregate
high-frequency data into a lower-frequency, but valuable information is lost in the process
and this influences the conclusions one obtains (see Rogers et al., 2014 and Ghysels et al.,
2017). Alternatively, one may discard low-frequency data and focus on event studies that look
at financial variables movements around policy announcement dates (see Krishnamurthy and
Vissing-Jorgensen, 2011a). This approach is also sub-optimal since it ignores the real e ects
of UMP measures. In addition, because high frequency data is volatile, noise may drive the
conclusions.
In this paper, we provide a mixed-frequency compromise (see Foroni and Marcellino, 2013a
for a survey of mixed-frequency methods): key macro variables are converted from monthly to
weekly-frequency using an augmented Gibbs sampler technique; financial variables are aggregated
from daily to weekly frequency by taking averages. Because ECB unconventional policy data is
reported weekly, a weekly frequency balances the desire to smooth some of the noise without
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since we only observe a mid-month average or end-of-the-month value, zi
t
.
1.3.1 Mixed Frequency with Irregular Spacings
Researchers trying to combine weekly with monthly data face an additional problem, fairly
neglected in the literature. Because of the irregular nature of weeks (some months contain four,
others five weeks), the Gibbs sampler, which is typically used to predict missing values, can not
be used mechanically and needs to be augmented by an additional step that draws the missing,
irregularly spaced observations. The approach we employ is similar to Eraker et al. (2015) and
Qian (2013), uses a Bayesian setting, and di ers from the usual Kalman filter approach (Carter
and Kohn, 1994) employed in the literature. In fact, rather than being predicted and smoothed,
missing data is sampled directly from a constrained multivariate normal distribution.
Unlike Kalman filter techniques, direct drawing is easily implementable with irregularly
spaced data. In addition, while the Kalman filter works sequentially, we can block sample, which
significantly increases the computational speed. There are two main drawbacks of the approach:
(1) the dependence of the Gibbs draws increases. We avoid this problem by appropriately
thinning the chains. (2) The number of nodes at which the distribution needs to be evaluated
increases and this a ects the tightness of the standard errors.
Apart from having to deal with irregularly spaced weeks, we also need to solve a time
aggregation problem. As monthly data is generally reported as a mid-point average, we need
to take this into account when drawing missing data. Unlike with end-of-the-period sampling,
where one draws the latent variables from an unconstrained multivariate normal distribution,
we need to draw all missing variables simultaneously from a constrained multivariate normal
distribution, so that the draws satisfy the monthly average. The algorithm we employ to estimate
the parameters is described in Appendix 1.B.
To avoid imposing too much a priori information which in unjustified, given our ignorance
about the properties of UMP shocks, we will use flat priors on all VAR coe cients.
1.3.2 Identification of UMP shocks
Since the countries we consider are relatively small open economies, they are likely to have little
influence on the euro area, while the latter has presumably a larger impact on them. Hence,
there is a natural block exogeneity in the system with the euro area block coming first. The
block exogeneity assumption has been used quite a lot in the empirical international literature
(e.g. Cushman and Zha, 1997; Mackowiak, 2007 ; Dungey and Pagan, 2009). It is stronger than
the one employed by Kim and Roubini (2000), where block exogeneity is only imposed on the
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contemporaneous matrix. The estimates we compute are equivalent to those obtained with the
two steps approach of Canova (2005a).
For each country pair we consider, the structural system is
A0,11y1t = A1,11(L)y1t≠1 + B1Êt + ‘1t, ‘1t ≥ N(0,  1) (1.2)
A0,21y1t + A0,22y2t = A1,21(L)y1t≠1 + A1,22(L)y2t≠1 + B2Êt + ‘2t, ‘2t ≥ N(0,  2) (1.3)
The endogenous variables of the small open economy are y2t = [IPt, fit, et, spt, lt, riskt]Õ, while
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) is a measure of risk. News
t
is a
dummy variable capturing UMP announcements; the conventional monetary policy tool (the
interest rate) is denoted by i
t≠1(iú
t≠1). Finally, PCt is the first Principal Component of a number
of control variables and it is described in more detail in the next subsection. It is important to
have both the conventional monetary policy tool and the UMP announcements as controls to
avoid confounding their e ects with those of the shocks of interest.
The variables included in the VAR are chosen so as to be able to examine the transmission
channels discussed in Section 2. The exchange rate channel is operative if UMP shocks generate
significant exchange rate movements; significant responses of the liquidity variable, on the other
hand, would indicate that credit channel is important; a strong and significant response of stock
prices would suggest the presence of a wealth channel; finally, a strong and significant response
of the risk variable would indicate that the confidence channel matters.
Because theory is silent regarding the features of UMP shocks, we identify them in an agnostic
way. We assume that output and inflation matter for UMP decisions within a week, but that the
UMP variable reacts to financial variables only with a week delay. Note that these restrictions
have to hold only for a week and are therefore weaker than similar restrictions imposed on a
monthly or a quarterly VAR.
The assumption that unconventional monetary policy reacts to financial factors with a delay
of at least a week is satisfied for the Long Term Refinancing Operation programs (LTRO) that
make up the largest proportion of UMP measures in our sample. However, for the Security
Market program (SMP), it may be less appropriate since Lo Duca et al. (2016) pointed out
that some of the decisions were taken at a daily frequency. The ordering of the variables within
the financial block is arbitrary. We have stock prices before the liquidity spread, since we
assume they react more slowly to monetary policy than liquidity in the interbank market due to
transaction costs. The risk variables appear last, since risk perceptions react fast and take all
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available information into account. In Section 7 we examine the robustness of the conclusions
when di erent identification assumptions are employed.
1.3.3 Data
All data comes from Datastream and the ECB. The sample spans from 18th December 2008
until 10th May 2014. The starting and ending dates have been chosen in order to (a) avoid
major structural breaks, (b) avoid the high volatility period following the Lehman crisis, (c)
have a time period where UMP were frequently used, (d) skip the era of negative interest rates,
applied on bank deposits by the ECB in June 2014. Excluding the first six months of the sample
and starting the estimation in June 2009 does not change the essence of the results we present.
We focus on nine European countries, some of which are EU members and some, which are
not. Since they have the largest trade and financial linkages with the euro area, they are the
most likely candidates to be influenced by the ECB’s policies. The majority of countries have
floating currency regimes (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Sweden, Norway).
Denmark and Bulgaria are instead pegged to the Euro, while Switzerland is a hybrid case, since
it switched from a floating regime to an exchange rate floor in September 2011. Rey (2015)
has argued that when cross border flows and leverage of global institutions matter, monetary
policy is transmitted globally even under floating exchange rate. Thus, our sample allows us
to examine how important the exchange rate regime is for the transmission of unconventional
monetary policy internationally. Also, it allows us to analyse whether policies targeted to a ect
liquidity and leverage have di erent impact than conventional measures.
In the baseline exercises, the monthly Industrial Production index is used as real activity
measure and the monthly Consumer Price Index is used for inflation. The policy variable is
calculated summing up LTRO, SMP and Covered Bond Purchase Programmes (CBP) (I and
II). The daily financial variables are the bilateral nominal exchange rate, the liquidity spread,
measured by the di erence between the 3-month and overnight interbank rates (e.g. EURIBOR-
EONIA for euro area), stock market indices, and CDS spreads. The CDS for the euro area are
computed weighting individual Euro members’ CDS using Eurostat weights. The announcement
dummy, News
t
, sums up the event dummies for LTROs, collateral changes, SMP, CBP I and
II 3. Implicit in this setup is the assumption that only surprises orthogonal to the monetary
information present at t ≠ 1 and to the announcement news at t are considered. Changing the
timing of the conditioning variables (announcement surprises at t + 1, and interest rates at t)
does not change the conclusions we obtain. Thus, the possibility that UMP measures were taken
3When we examine the role of conventional monetary policy shocks, we switch the role of interest rates and of
the balance sheet variable. When we examine announcement surprises, we keep the nominal interest rates as
predetermined and use the balance sheet variable at t ≠ 1 as a control variable.
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as a substitute or as a complement to conventional surprises is statistically weak.
Apart from using the nominal interest rate and the announcement dummy of euro area UMP
measures, we use a principal component (PC) indicator as control variable for global factors.
This PC is computed using US and UK (conventional and unconventional) policy variables,
global real economy indicators, oil prices, Eastern European and EU (excluding EA) financial
indicators, global trade price, and global equity indicators. This also enables us to filter out
dynamics, which could be spuriously attributed to UMP measures, but are in fact due to e.g. oil
price shocks, global business cycle variations, or monetary policy decisions taken outside the
euro area.
Since VAR data is used as conditioning set to draw the latent variables, it is essential
that all variables (and in particular the higher-frequency ones) exhibit an approximate normal
distribution. All macroeconomic variables, UMP, asset prices, and CDS enter the VAR in
log-growth rates. We use first di erences for the liquidity spread, and interest rates remain in
level. The financial data transformed this way shows less skewness and almost no kurtosis. Note
that, while long run relationships will be lost, our transformation helps to have the data on a
similar scale, making the Gibbs sampler more e cient, and economic interpretation easier.
Since we have some latitude in choosing the unconventional monetary variable and the
risk measure, we have conducted a number of robustness experiments. In particular, we
examined euro area responses when an excess liquidity variable is used instead of a balance
sheet unconventional monetary variable. This variable is computed using the di erence between
the current account and reserve requirements plus the net of the deposit and marginal lending
facilities. We furthermore split the balance sheet variable into liquidity measures and sovereign
measures. We checked using aggregated daily and weekly data at the monthly frequency, and
substituted the VIX index for CDS risk, when possible. The next sections comments on the
results and Appendix 1.C plots the responses we obtain.
1.4 Domestic Transmission
We first present the dynamics produced by UMP shocks in the euro area, as can be seen in
the first column of Figure 1.2. We plot this to compare our results with those present in the
literature, and to provide a benchmark to understand international dynamics. Figure 1.2 also
reports the responses obtained following an expansionary conventional monetary policy shock
(second column) and a UMP announcement (third column).
A few features of the dynamics are note worthy. First, following a UMP shock inflation
significantly and persistently increases, while real activity responses are negative on impact and
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Figure 1.2: Responses of euro area variables to shocks
Note: The shaded regions report point-wise 68% credible intervals. The horizontal axis reports weeks; the
vertical axis monthly growth rates for all variables but the liquidity spread, the interest rate (for conventional
monetary policy) and the announcement dummy.
then insignificant. This latter pattern is in contrast to what researchers have found for the US and
UK. However, while central banks in these countries engaged in large asset purchase programs to
drive up yields and aggregate demand, euro area UMP measures were aimed mainly at providing
liquidity for the interbank market. In order for output e ects to materialise, the additional
liquidity needed to reach the real economy via bank lending and there is little evidence that this
has happened (Borstel et al., 2015). In addition, since euro area members di er substantially in
their bank lending responses, failure to observe positive aggregate real activity responses may be
due to regional heterogeneities (Santis and Surico, 2013; Altavilla et al., 2016a).
To understand whether the lack of positive real activity responses depends on particular
features of the empirical model, we have re-run the analysis (i) with aggregated monthly variables,
(ii) with an excess liquidity measure as indicator of unconventional monetary policy, (iii) splitting
liquidity from sovereign bond unconventional policies (see Appendix 1.C). Real activity responses
are still insignificant at all horizons in the monthly VAR, and disturbances to excess liquidity
variable produce the same pattern of real activity and inflation responses as in the baseline case.
This lets us conclude that the use of mixed frequency data and of the balance sheet variable
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as a measure of UMP are not responsible for our conclusions. However, aggregating liquidity
and sovereign debt programs may not be ideal if the task is to measure the real e ectiveness of
UMP measures. In fact, while liquidity disturbances lead to the same pattern of output and
inflation responses as in the baseline case, sovereign debt disturbances produce small medium
term positive real activity responses and negative inflation responses.
Second, the responses of financial variables are in line with expectations. Stock prices initially
fall and then persistently increase and the responses are generally significant; liquidity spread
responses are positive but insignificant on impact and turn significantly negative in the medium
run; the responses of the risk variable are generally negative but insignificant. Thus, while the
liquidity and the wealth channels are operative, at least in the medium run, the confidence
channel seems weak.
Third, as in Gambacorta et al. (2014), we find that real activity responses are stickier and less
significant than those obtained after a conventional monetary policy disturbances. In particular,
conventional monetary policy disturbances seem to have a persistent positive e ect on output
-the largest e ect occurs after 8-10 weeks - but an insignificant e ect on inflation. Hence, jointly
using conventional and unconventional monetary tools may help to better control output and
inflation dynamics in the area.
Fourth, risk perceptions persistently decrease following a conventional monetary policy
disturbance, and stock prices increase for up to 8 weeks while the liquidity spread is not
significantly a ected. The dynamics of these three financial variables are both quantitatively
and qualitatively in line with what is known in the euro area (see e.g. Christo el et al., 2008).
The weak response of inflation and the strong decrease in risk are a feature of our sample period,
which only starts in 2008, and includes both the financial and the European sovereign debt
crises.
Finally, a UMP announcement surprise does not have measurable e ects on output or inflation.
The responses of financial variables, although less significant, resemble those produced by a
conventional policy disturbance (see also Szczerbowicz, 2015). Altavilla et al. (2016b) have shown
that OMT announcements have significant e ects on output of Mediterranean countries. Our
results are not necessarily in contrast with theirs. First, while they find that output positively
reacts in Spain and Italy, no e ect is found in France and Germany. Hence, the aggregate
e ects they find may be insignificant. Second, they consider only the announcement of one
program, while we examine the e ects of announcements of all UMP programs. Third, their
methodology is di erent: while they use the persistent financial responses that announcements
induce as measure for announcement e ects in the VAR, we use a dummy approach. Finally, as
Ghysels et al. (2017) and Rogers et al. (2014) argued, to measure the e ects of announcements,
higher-frequency data, ideally intra-daily, should be used. Hence, our announcements e ects
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Figure 1.3 shows the median posterior responses of the variables of the nine foreign economies to
a euro area UMP shock, in deviations from the responses obtained in the euro area (except for the
exchange rate which is plotted in level). Positive and significant responses of real activity would
indicate that a UMP shock generates foreign output responses which are significantly larger than
those obtained in the euro area. For representation purposes, responses are grouped into di erent
country groups: (a) Advanced countries - Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Switzerland, (b) Central
Eastern European countries (CEE) - Poland and the Czech Republic, and (c) Southern Eastern
European countries (SEE) - Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. Figure C.1 in the Appendix
reports group average responses with the associated posterior credible sets.
Output responses to euro area UMP shocks are quite heterogeneous. While in advanced
countries, responses are persistently positive and significantly larger than in the euro area
after two weeks, those in the CEE countries are insignificant, and those in SEE countries
are persistently negative and significantly smaller than in the euro area after about two weeks.
Inflation responses are also heterogeneous: they are positive for CEE and SEE countries, generally
after about 2 or 3 weeks, and negative for advanced economies.
Why are macroeconomic responses so di erent across countries? One possibility is that
certain countries are insulated from foreign shocks while others are not because of di erent
exchange rate regimes. Such an explanation does not seem to hold up with both peggers and
floaters being part of the advanced countries group. As is pointed out in Rey (2015), having
floating exchange rates does not necessarily insulate a country from importing euro area monetary
policy decisions. A related explanation could be that di erent real exchange rate dynamics
lead to di erent trade gains across country groups. Again, this explanation seems incapable
to account for the heterogeneities we find: real exchange rate responses are all negative (the
local currency appreciate versus the Euro).4 Lo Duca et al. (2016) and Fratzscher et al. (2017)
also find a (nominal) appreciation using an event study approach and much higher-frequency
data. Therefore, while the exchange rate channel is activated following UMP shocks, di erential
exchange rate dynamics do not explain the pattern of macroeconomic responses we obtain.
Gopinath (2015) suggest that similar currency appreciations do not necessarily lead to
similar dynamics of exports and imports, if firms behave in non-competitive pricing and alter
4The exchange rate for Denmark and Bulgaria only reports the price level di erential, as the exchange rate is
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mark-ups following a nominal appreciation. Therefore, if countries have di erent levels of non-
competitiveness, similar appreciations of the currency may lead to di erent inflation responses
across countries. While the inflation dynamics we present are prima-facie consistent with this
explanation, it is hard to see how di erential non-competitive behaviour may lead to the variety
of output responses that we obtain.
Another reason for why output and inflation responses could be di erent is that euro area
UMP shocks occur at the same time as e.g. oil shocks, and that hence our responses are
potentially spurious. Again, this explanation does not seem to be relevant for two reasons: (1)
We have conditioned on oil prices (via PCs) in the VAR. (2) The only oil producing country of
our sample (Norway) displays large output responses but also negative stock price responses,
which are hard to rationalise if the UMP shocks proxied for oil shocks.
Cross-country heterogeneities of output and inflation responses could be generated if euro
area UMP disturbances hit countries at di erent stages of the business and the financial cycles.
As Figures C.7 and C.8 show, this hypothesis can be rejected, since both the business and the
financial cycles of the nine countries are closely synchronised.
Another possibility one can consider to account for the international macroeconomic
heterogeneities is that some countries conducted their own UMP measures at the same time
as the ECB engaged in non-conventional policies, while others did not. While lack of detailed
information prevents us directly linking monetary decisions to existing heterogeneities, we have
one country - Sweden - where liquidity policies were conducted from October 2008 until December
2010, but not thereafter. Thus, comparing the responses in the two sub-samples, we can check
whether the presence of domestic UMP measures makes a di erence. Figures C.5 and C.6 report
the absolute impulse responses following a UMP shock in the euro area. They indicate that when
liquidity measures were in place, output responses were positive and inflation responses were
insignificant; when they were not output responses were insignificant and inflation responses
were positive. However, since the second sub-sample roughly corresponds to the period when
the ECB implemented sovereign debt policies, it is di cult to reliably attribute these di erences
to the presence of domestic UMP measures. We discuss our favourite explanation in Section 6.
Stock prices responses are significantly di erent from those obtained in the euro area. They
initially increase for all countries but Norway, and then fall for up to 8 weeks with Denmark as
the exception. Note that the responses in CEE and SEE countries are slightly more persistent
than in advanced countries. Positive international stock price responses have also been found
in event studies such as Lo Duca et al. (2016) and Fratzscher et al. (2017) and are consistent
with the presence of both wealth and portfolio rebalancing channels: at least on impact stock
prices increase significantly more than in the euro area. In the medium run, stock prices of all
countries either increase by less than in the euro area or fall.
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There is considerable heterogeneities in the responses of the risk spread: consistent with
the finding of Fratzscher et al. (2017), it declines relative to the euro area for CEE and SEE
countries (with the exception of Hungary), while it increases for advanced countries. Note that
risk responses are large in absolute value, even though we are using CDS spreads to infer risk.
Given that country risk usually serves as a floor for domestic financial risk, the true risk e ects
may be even larger.
The credit channel, on the other hand, seems to be weak. Except for Romania and perhaps
Poland, the liquidity spread is not responding significantly to euro area UMP disturbances. This
is in line with Williams and Taylor (2009), who find that the LIBOR-OIS spread did not react
to the FED’s QE1.
In sum, the financial market responses we obtain are in line with those found in high-
frequency event studies. Hence, aggregating daily financial data does not entail a significant
loss of information regarding the international transmission of UMP measures. Interestingly,
our analysis shows that macroeconomic responses to UMP disturbances are very much country
specific, even when financial market responses are similar.
1.5.1 A Counterfactual
To quantify the relative importance of financial vs. trade channels in transmitting UMP
disturbances we perform a counterfactual exercise: we trace out the dynamics of the foreign
variables to a euro area UMP shock holding either stock prices, liquidity and risk spreads, or
the exchange rate constant. Thus, in the former case international links are generated via the
exchange rate, while in the latter case only financial transmission takes place. Figure 1.4 presents
the results of our exercise. In the first panel, we report the benchmark output and inflation
responses we had in Figure 1.3, in the second, the responses obtained switching o  the exchange
rate channel, and in the third, the responses obtained switching o  the financial channels.
Eliminating the exchange rate channel slightly alters the magnitude but does not change
the shape of the responses. Overall, exchange rate movements seem to slightly reduce output
responses and slightly amplify inflation responses. Hence, the trade e ects that exchange rate
variations may induce are minor in the case of UMP disturbances. In contrast, shutting o 
financial channels has major e ects on foreign output and inflation responses: output responses
are now insignificant except on impact and display no persistence, and inflation now drops on
impact, because the currency generally appreciates and imported inflation falls. Note also that
output and inflation responses are now more homogenous. To conclude, cross-country di erences
in financial-macro linkages are likely to be the reason for the cross-country heterogeneity of the
output and inflation responses.
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Figure 1.4: Counterfactual responses to a euro area UMP shock, foreign countries
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Note: The lines report the point-wise posterior median impulse responses in deviations from the euro area
responses. The horizontal axis reports weeks, the vertical axis monthly growth rates.
1.5.2 International E ects of Conventional Monetary Policy and
Announcement Surprises
In Appendix 1.C we present the international responses obtained when conventional monetary
policy shocks and announcement surprises are considered.
Conventional monetary policy shocks induce very heterogeneous international dynamics. For
advanced countries, the exchange rate temporarily appreciates relative to the Euro, but there is
very little di erence with euro area as far as output and inflation responses are concerned and
this occurs despite the fact that both the liquidity and the risk spreads are quite heterogeneous
across countries. For CEE countries, the exchange rate depreciates relative to the Euro, but
output falls and stock prices increase while the risk spread eventually decreases. Finally, for
SEE countries, the local currency generally depreciates, and output temporarily increases, while
stock prices fall and the risk spreads increase.
Announcement surprises produce macroeconomic responses, which are similar to those
obtained in the euro area for many advanced and SEE countries. The exchange rate and the
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financial responses resemble those obtained with a conventional monetary policy shock with
Denmark being the exception. However, exchange rate responses are far less persistent. Also,
SEE seem to be the countries whose financial markets benefit most from ECB unconventional
measures: stock prices increase while the liquidity and the risk spread decrease.
In sum, the evidence suggests that the exchange rate, wealth, risk and portfolio rebalancing
channels spill euro area UMP shocks to foreign countries. Advanced economies tend to have
output and inflation dynamics, which resemble those of the euro area, even though output
e ects are larger and inflation e ects smaller. For the remaining countries the macroeconomic
consequences di er. The exchange rate channel does not seem to shape the responses of foreign
macroeconomic variables. In fact, the financial channels are very important for the international
transmission of UMP disturbances. This is in sharp contrast with the international transmission
of conventional monetary policy shocks, where exchange rate movements drive foreign output
and inflation dynamics.
1.6 Why are foreign macroeconomic responses hetero-
geneous?
As we have seen, positive financial spillovers from UMP disturbances do not necessarily translate
into positive real transmission. In addition, even in countries where financial market responses
are somewhat similar, real responses are heterogeneous. In this section, we examine the reasons
behind this heterogeneity.
The IMF (2013a) states that between 70-90% of assets in CEE and SEE countries is held by
foreign banks and claims that these assets amount to, at least, 50% of domestic GDP. Since
foreign banks, which in the countries under consideration are mostly from the euro area, have
access to the cheap ECB liquidity, they may invest into foreign financial markets what they
borrow from the ECB rather than lend it to domestic agents. This would positively a ect
foreign asset prices, reduce foreign risk, but would not lead to positive real spillovers, as foreign
loans would not be a ected by the additional liquidity banks obtain. Hence, if countries are
heterogeneous in the composition of their banking sector, similar financial market responses may
lead to di erent real e ects. In particular, in countries featuring a large share of foreign banks,
global liquidity increases should have the smallest pass-through to the real economy.
Figure 1.4 reports the average responses for countries with low foreign bank share (at least
2/3 of banks are domestic) and high foreign ownership. Confirming our intuition, we find no
significant di erence in the dynamics of the liquidity spread in the two groups, but we observe a
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Figure 1.5: Comparative Impulse Responses to a UMP shock
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Note: The lines report the point-wise average posterior median responses in deviations from the euro area
responses. The dotted line represents the 68% point-wise credible sets. Low foreign bank share countries
are Sweden (52%), Norway (58%), Poland (63%) and Denmark (61%); high foreign bank shares countries are
Switzerland (72%), Czech Republic (92%), Hungary (100%), Romania (72%) and Bulgaria (81%). Data on
foreign bank shares comes from the Bank of International Settlement and is for 2012.
stark di erence in the response of stock prices and risk. Countries with high share of foreign
bank ownership experience an increase in stock prices and a reduction in risk relative to the euro
area; countries with a lower share of foreign banks, feature declining stock prices and increasing
risk. In addition, while the former display falling relative real output growth, the latter show a
significant relative output increase a few weeks after the euro area UMP shock.
To provide further evidence that the structure of domestic financial markets is crucial to
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understand the international transmission of UMP disturbances, we group countries according
to the level of financial development (as provided in Schwab, 2012) and the credit-to-GDP ratio.
With these two alternative classifications, the groups remains unchanged except for Poland and
Switzerland, which switch groups. The financially advanced, high credit-to-GDP ratio countries
(Sweden, Norway, Denmark) behave like the low foreign bank share countries, while the less
financially advanced, low credit-to-GDP economies (CEE and SEE) show the same responses as
the high foreign bank share countries. These results agree with Aizenman et al. (2015), who
claim that higher levels of financial development can mitigate the negative e ects of a foreign
UMP shock and that financially more open but potentially less developed small economies are
more sensitive to foreign UMP shocks. They also agree with Dedola et al. (2017), who shows
that spillovers of US monetary shocks are largest for emerging economies whose level of financial
development is generally low, and with Ongena et al. (2015) who point out that local lending in
foreign currencies, which is common among high foreign bank share countries, leads to a stronger
international bank lending channel and weaker domestic monetary transmission.
1.7 Robustness
The results presented so far are derived under the identification assumption that a UMP shock
has no weekly e ect on output and inflation and that the UMP variable does not respond within
a week to financial variables. While the first assumption is hard to dispute, the second could be
debatable. Furthermore, the ordering of variables within the financial block is arbitrary. In this
section we discuss what happens when we alter identification assumptions. The responses for
these cases are in Appendix 1.C.
1.7.1 Changing the Ordering of Euro Area Financial Variables
We considered three alternative orderings of the variables of the euro area block; two where
financial variables are permuted (R1: output, inflation, UMP, liquidity, stock prices, and risk;
R2: output, inflation, UMP, risk, stock prices, and liquidity); and one where the policy variable
reacts within a week to macro and financial variables, meaning that the ECB monitored financial
markets on a weekly basis when deciding UMP which, as mentioned, seem to have occurred
with the Securities Market Programme - roughly 10% of the UMP in our sample (R3: output,
inflation, stock prices, liquidity, risk and UMP).
No major di erences are noticeable between the baseline and the R1 and R2 schemes except
for the kink in the liquidity spread responses for Romania. Thus, the order of the variables
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within the financial block is inconsequential for the transmission properties of UMP shocks.
Some changes appear when the R3 scheme is used. The responses for euro area variables
are qualitatively similar, even though stock prices and risk responses are less significant.
Internationally, the most notable change is in the dynamics of peggers countries: the responses
of inflation and of the liquidity spread are now stronger; those of stock prices and of risk are
weaker. Thus, the relative importance of the wealth and portfolio channels may depend on
whether we allow the UMP variable to react to financial variables or not.
1.7.2 Identification of UMP via Sign and Zero Restrictions
While the identification scheme that we have used for euro area UMP shocks with weekly data
imposes relatively weak restrictions, we also examined the dynamics with an identification scheme,
which mixes sign and zero restrictions. In particular, we still assume that output and inflation
do not react to UMP shocks within a week, but impose that a positive UMP shock increases
the UMP variable and makes the liquidity spread non-positive for one period. Restrictions of
this type have been used by Gambacorta et al. (2014) and Carrera et al. (2015a), and seem
reasonable since the main goal of several UMP measures was to increase the liquidity of financial
markets.
Since this scheme identifies a set rather than a point in the space of contemporaneous
matrices, responses are generally more uncertain. Qualitatively speaking, the responses for the
exchange rate, the liquidity spread, and risk are as in the baseline, while the response of stock
prices is, on average, more negative. Interestingly, the dynamic responses of output and inflation
are similar to those of the R3 scheme for most countries. Thus, the idea that unconventional
monetary policy may react to liquidity on a weekly basis finds additional support.
1.7.3 Identification via Heteroskedasticity
The use of higher-frequency data makes us less sensitive to the issue of policy endogeneity but
still imposes some restrictions on financial variables. As a further check on the robustness of
our conclusions, we use volatility changes to identify UMP shocks as in Rigobon (2003). The
method requires that there are at least two regimes with di erent volatilities (e.g. low and high),
assumes that shocks are uncorrelated, and that the contemporaneous impact matrix and the
parameters of the VAR are stable. While the restrictions such an identification scheme imposes
are weak, one should also remember that regimes are often arbitrarily chosen and that shocks
identified this way have very little economic interpretation (Kilian, 2013).
We check for the presence of di erent regimes/structural breaks in the reduced form VAR
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residuals informally. There is a decrease in volatility in a number of the equations roughly
corresponding to Mario Draghi’s famous ‘whatever it takes’ speech on the 26th July 2012. This
decrease is marked in the liquidity and UMP equations for the euro area, and in the exchange
rate, liquidity, and risk equations for some countries.
To estimate the system, we condition the Gibbs sampler on the variances for the two regimes as
Kulikov and Netsunajev (2013a). We divide the sample in pre-Draghi speech, s1, and post-Draghi










The diagonal matrix, D(s2), is employed to determine the short-run run matrix, A0, once
posterior variances are computed using  ≠1(1) = AÕ0A0,  ≠1(2) = AÕ0D(s2)≠1A0, where
D(s1) = I.
Since not all countries display volatility changes around the chosen breakpoint, general
conclusions are di cult to draw. While responses are not very significant, the basic conclusions
we have obtained are unchanged: output responses vary across countries with advanced countries
displaying strong positive responses while responses in CEE and SEE countries are negative; the
real exchange rate appreciates for most countries; the credit channel is weak.
1.8 Conclusion
This paper examined the international transmission of euro area UMP disturbances. We
contributed to the literature in three ways: (1) From a methodological point of view, we
provide a way to combine low-frequency macroeconomic data with high-frequency financial data,
minimising time-aggregation and policy endogeneity biases. (2) From an economic point of
view, we shed light into the e ect of unconventional ECB measures using a framework where
macro-financial linkages are properly accounted for and an international perspective is adopted.
(3) From a policy perspective, we provide new evidence on the role of exchange rate regime in
internationally transmitting monetary policy decisions in a world where cross border flows and
leverage matter.
Moreover, we answered our three questions in the introduction: First, do European Central
Bank UMP measures generate important macroeconomic e ects in European countries not
adopting the Euro? We document that UMP shocks generate important euro area financial
market responses, sizeable macroeconomic fluctuations, and are similar to conventional monetary
policy shocks in terms of timing and persistence relative. Interestingly, while UMP disturbances
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induce significant inflation, conventional monetary policy disturbances primarily a ect output.
This means that a combination of conventional and unconventional measures may help to
better control output and inflation dynamics. Announcement surprises produce financial market
responses, which are similar to those of conventional policy shocks, but output and inflation
e ects are weak.
Second, does the degree of financial integration matter? In particular, is it true that larger
financial market integration led to more significant international real co-movements in response
to UMP disturbances? International spillovers exist but there is considerable cross-country
heterogeneity. The exchange rate regime is not the reason of this heterogeneity. Advanced
economies, which are more financially integrated with the euro area and have a larger share of
domestic banks, tend to have output and inflation dynamics, which are qualitatively similar
but generally stronger than those in the euro area. The macroeconomic e ects for financially
less developed countries, which have a larger share of foreign banks, are varied, but output and
inflation responses are the opposite of those of advanced economies. Third, which channel of
international transmission is operative? What is the relative importance of trade and financial
spillovers in propagating UMP shocks? International transmission occurs both via trade (the
exchange rate channel) and financial links (wealth, risk and portfolio rebalancing channels).
However, the exchange rate rate does not seem to shape the responses of foreign macroeconomic
variables to euro area UMP shocks. This is in contrast to the international transmission of
conventional policy shocks, where the exchange rate is crucial to understand foreign dynamics.
Our results have important policy implications. In our sample of countries, the exchange
rate regime is unimportant to explain cross-country di erences in the dynamics of real activity
and inflation. Exchange rate movements are closely watched by policymakers and, as the
quotes from the introduction suggest, are considered crucial for the international propagation of
UMP decisions. However, when financial channels are dominant and capital flows important,
controlling exchange rate movements will not prevent non-euro area countries from importing the
unconventional monetary policy decisions of the ECB (see also Rey, 2015). Since the dynamics of
financial flows are crucial and the presence of global banks in the area is important in determining
domestic outcomes (Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2012), policies that indirectly restrict financial flows
and bank leverage could be more e ective in insulating the small open economies in our sample
from undesired output and inflation fluctuations. Devereux et al. (2015) provide the theoretical
justification for using such measures.
The current work can be extended in various ways. One could study announcement e ects in
more detail. While we controlled for them in the estimation, we did not consider any potential
anticipatory e ect that announcements can generate. Taking expectations into account might
increase the significance of the credit channel. We could also extend the sample of countries
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and include the recent QE measures in the analysis. Finally, we have assumed that structural
parameters are stable. Ciccarelli et al. (2013) suggested that time variations could play an
important role in international policy transmission. Investigations of this type can improve our
understanding of how UMP measures are transmitted and give policymakers a more solid ground
to decide which policy to implement.
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1.A Timeline of ECB Unconventional Measures
According to Trichet (2009) ECB’s unconventional toolbox included five liquidity policy measures
to aid the interbank market. The first of these tools was introduced in October 2008 - the new
fixed-rate full allotment tender procedure - and designed to ensure that the high demand for
liquidity, which reached a peak of 95 billion Euros during the crisis, could be met. The policy
allows credit institutions to acquire an unlimited amount of Euros in an auction at a fixed rate.
The second, also introduced in October 2008, expanded the list of assets that were accepted as
collateral. These two tools together ensured an almost unlimited refinancing to the 2200 credit
institutions, which had access. The third tool allowed lengthening of the maturities of the longer
term refinancing operations (LTROs) from three months to up to three years. In March and
July 2008, the first six-month full allotments were announced and twelve-month LTROs were
introduced in June 2009. In December 2011 and then again in February 2012, LTROs with a
maturity of three years were introduced to provide more long-term liquidity and to ease interbank
market tensions. The fourth tool ensured enough liquidity of foreign currency, particularly of
the US Dollar. This was conducted through a direct swap line with the Federal Reserve. The
final measure, covered bond purchases (CBPs), introduced in 2009, allowed the ECB to purchase
of debt securities issued by banks. This allowed banks to have even longer-term funding than
through refinancing operations following the complete shut down of the covered bond market
during the financial crisis 5. In November 2011, a second round of CBPs was introduced. These
5CBPs are di erent from asset backed securities. The risk associated with covered bonds stays with the
originator, so that the ECB was not necessarily subjected to more risk and the issuing institution still had an
incentive to constantly evaluate credit risk. This is in contrast to the US and the UK, where the Fed started
buying asset-backed securities, commercial papers and direct obligation of mortgage backed securities and the
BoE introduced an asset purchase facility, to ease the non-bank credit market. Since banks are the biggest
holders of covered bonds in Europe, such a measure was designed to improve interbank market conditions.
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five tools make up what we term (in-) direct liquidity policy.
As far as sovereign debt policy is concerned, a measure was introduced in May 2010 that
allowed the ECB to purchase public and private debt securities - the Security Market Programme
(SMP). The o cial objective of the SMP is to provide more liquidity to ‘dysfunctional’ market
segments to ensure that transmission channels for monetary policy are properly operating. The
ECB conducted sterilising operations to re-absorb the excess liquidity. The composition of the
SMP consisted of 47% Italian debt, 22% Spanish, 16% Greek and the remaining percent on Irish
and Portuguese debt. The final measure was announced in August 2012, when the SMP was
aborted - the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT). Similarly to the SMP, the OMT is the




1.B Mixed Frequency Algorithm
This appendix describes the algorithm used to draw sequences for the posterior distribution of
the missing variables and of the parameters - see also Qian (2013).
Let zrt be the vector of all missing observations and let (z, x) represent all recorded
observations. The algorithm works as follows:
1. Define a matrix of data Y (missing observations are indicated by NaN).
2. Analyse the aggregation structure (if data comes as sum, average, end-of-period) and
define a matrix, M , indicating which observations are missing. For example, if we have two
variables, one monthly average which we observe once in the final week, and one weekly
which we observe four times, we construct ≠æM , vectorising M
kxT
column by column, so that
≠æ
M = [0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1]Õ.







and the sum z
b
= (b ≠ a + 1)z
a,b
.
4. Specify a normal prior for the coe cients, A, B, and an inverted Wishart prior the variance
 .
5. Draw initial values for the coe cients, A, B, and for the variance  .
6. Specify initial values for the latent data by substituting missing values with sums computed
from Step 3.
7. Construct the matrix T
T k◊T k
that will account for time-aggregation. In our case T = 262
and k = 12. Initially, T
3144◊3144
is an identity matrix. Using the matrix M , we scan each
row,i, and column,j, for missing values, m. In the previous example, we have m = 1, 2, 3
in i = 1 right before j = 4. We add one for every missing variable to the transformation
matrix in row (j ≠ 1)k + i and column (j ≠ 1)k + i ≠ mk. The transformation matrix is
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1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0




8. Transform the data using ≠æMY , so that we have both, a latent disaggregated block and an
observed block.
9. Start the Gibbs sampler:
(a) Estimate the VAR coe cients and draw parameter estimates from f(Ai, Bi|Ŷ i,  i≠1).
(b) Estimate the variances of the VAR and draw the variance estimates from f( i≠1|Ŷ i, Ai, Bi).
(c) Compute the covariance matrix of the VAR using draws for the coe cients, Â, B̂,
and the variance  ̂.
(d) Constrain the multivariate normal (MVN) distribution using the transformation
matrix A, so that y
t
≥ MV N(A÷, A AÕ) = MV N(µ,  ). The distribution for the
latent variables is
zrt|z, x ≥ MV N(µ0 +  01 ≠111 ((z, x)Õ ≠ µ1),  00 ≠  01 ≠111  10), (1.6)
where  01 is a submatrix of   representing the covariances between the missing and
the observed observations.  00 is the variance of the missing observations and  11 is
the variance of the observed data.
(e) Sample missing data from the conditional constrained MVN described in Step 9.d (in
blocks). That is, for all t = 1, .., T , we draw missing data from f(ẑi
t
|x, ẑi≠1rt , Ai, Bi,  i).
(f) Repeat steps (a) through (e).
10. Examine convergence using e.g. CUSUM statistics.
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The results we present are based on 12500 draws: we discard the first 2500 as burn-in, and retain
every 20th draw to reduce serial correlation. Inference is based on 500 saved draws.
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1.C Additional Results
Figure C.1: Euro area responses to UMP shocks: monthly VAR
Note: The shaded regions report point-wise 68% credible intervals. The horizontal axis reports weeks; the
vertical axis monthly growth rates for all variables but the liquidity spread.
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Figure C.2: Euro area responses UMP shocks: Excess liquidity as a measure of UMP.
Note: The shaded regions report point-wise 68% credible intervals. The horizontal axis reports weeks; the
vertical axis monthly growth rates for all variables but the liquidity spread and excess liquidity.
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Figure C.3: Euro area responses UMP shocks: Shocks to UMP liquidity variable.
Note: The shaded regions report point-wise 68% credible intervals. The horizontal axis reports weeks; the
vertical axis monthly growth rates for all variables but the liquidity spread.
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Figure C.4: Euro area responses UMP shocks: Shocks to UMP sovereign bond variable.
Note: The shaded regions report point-wise 68% credible intervals. The horizontal axis reports weeks; the
vertical axis monthly growth rates for all variables but the liquidity spread.
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Figure C.5: Swedish responses to UMP shocks, sample with Sweden UMP measures.
Note: The shaded regions report point-wise 68% credible intervals. The horizontal axis reports weeks; the
vertical axis monthly growth rates for all variables but the liquidity spread in absolute terms.
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Figure C.6: Swedish responses to UMP shocks: sample without Sweden UMP measures
Note: The shaded regions report point-wise 68% credible intervals. The horizontal axis reports weeks; the
vertical axis monthly growth rates for all variables but the liquidity spread in absolute terms.
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Figure C.7: Real activity dynamics in the nine countries












Note: The horizontal axis reports time; the vertical axis the level of the IP index.
Figure C.8: Financial dynamics in the nine countries















Note: The figure reports the dynamics of the first principal component of stock prices, liquidity and risk spreads.
The horizontal axis reports time; the vertical axis monthly growth rates.
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Additional Results
Figure C.9: Group responses to euro area UMP shocks













































Note: The solid lines report point-wise average posterior median responses in deviations from euro area responses.
The dotted lines point-wise 68% credible intervals. The x-axis reports weeks, while the y-axis monthly growth
rates for all variables but the liquidity spread.
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Figure C.12: Foreign responses to euro area UMP shocks: Identification R1















































SE NO SW CZ PO HU RO BG DK
Note: The lines report point-wise posterior median responses in deviations from euro area responses. The x-axis
reports weeks, the y-axis monthly growth rates for all variables but the liquidity spread. The size of the shock is
one standard deviation of UMP growth (a 10% monthly increase in the quantity of UMP).
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Figure C.13: Foreign responses to euro area UMP shocks: Identification R2















































SE NO SW CZ PO HU RO BG DK
Note: The lines report point-wise posterior median responses in deviations from euro area responses. The x-axis
reports weeks, the y-axis monthly growth rates for all variables but the liquidity spread. The size of the shock is
one standard deviation of UMP growth (a 10% monthly increase in the quantity of UMP).
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Figure C.14: Foreign responses to euro area UMP shocks: Identification R3













































SE NO SW CZ PO HU RO BG DK
Note: The lines report point-wise posterior median responses in deviations from euro area responses. The x-axis
reports weeks, the y-axis monthly growth rates for all variables but the liquidity spread. The size of the shock is
one standard deviation of UMP growth (a 10% monthly increase in the quantity of UMP).
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Figure C.15: Foreign responses to euro area UMP shocks: Identification via zero and sign
restrictions













































SE NO SW CZ PO HU RO BG DK
Note: The lines report point-wise posterior median responses in deviations from euro area responses. The x-axis
reports weeks, the y-axis monthly growth rates for all variables but the liquidity spread. The size of the shock is
one standard deviation of UMP growth (a 10% monthly increase in the quantity of UMP).
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Figure C.16: Foreign responses to euro area UMP shocks: Identification via heteroskedasticity




































SE NO SW CZ PO HU RO BG DK
Note: The lines report point-wise posterior median responses in deviations from euro area responses. The x-axis
reports weeks, the y-axis monthly growth
rates for all variables but the liquidity spread. The size of the shock is one standard deviation of UMP growth (a













This paper is currently available as "Asymmetric Macro-Financial Spillovers," Working Paper
Series 337 (2017), Sveriges Riksbank.
2.1 Introduction
It is commonly assumed that financial cycles are procyclical and accelerate business cycle
fluctuations (see e.g. Borio, 2014). It is more disputed whether the relationship between financial
and real cycles is symmetric. Symmetry would imply that financial booms strengthen business
cycle booms to the same extent as financial busts intensify recessions. While the financial crisis
in 2008 has shown that a downturn in the financial sector can cause a long and deep recession,
there is growing evidence to suggest that financial sector upturns do not reinforce business cycle
booms in the same way (see e.g. Del Negro and Schorfheide, 2013 and Lindé et al., 2016).
The nature of the procyclicality is particularly interesting for the euro area, as the financial
sector plays a special role for the real economy. Unlike the US, the European financial sector
consists mostly of banks, and corporate debt financing is largely conducted via bank loans
rather than debt securities. This creates a strong feedback loop between the banking sector
and the real economy.1 The financial sector adds on average only 5% of gross value added to
the GDP of the euro area. Despite this seemingly small contribution, the dynamics of both the
business and financial cycles are very similar. As shown in Figure 2.1, which displays cyclical
and financial indicators that are constructed from GDP and asset price data2, the turning points
1The share of corporate financing in the US is 80% via debt securities and 20% via bank loans, while in the
euro area the share is 16% debt securities and 84% bank loans (based on the ECB flow of funds and the FED
financial account data).
2The financial indicator is similar to Borio et al. (1994). It includes both private property and equity prices
for private sector wealth. I use the private property index provided by the ECB, and the Euro Stoxx 50 as a
measure for equity. The weights of the two factors are given in the ESA 2010 survey by Table 26 and Table 7,
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in the business and financial cycles are strongly correlated. Furthermore, in agreement with
Jordà (2014); Borio (2014), financial cycles tend to lead business cycles and are more volatile.
Also note that while the overall correlation between the two cycles is positive and large with a
correlation coe cient of 0.77, the positive correlation for booms disappears after 2010 indicating
that the procyclicality might indeed be asymmetric.
Figure 2.1: The Financial and Business Cycle in the Euro Area





















































Note: The blue, dashed line indicates the business cycle, and the red, solid line shows the financial
cycle. I follow Drehmann et al. (2012) and characterise the business and financial cycles using the
Band-Pass Filter. The business cycle is constructed on real GDP data, while I use a composite asset
price indicator with house prices and equity prices as measures of private financial wealth. Note the
di erent scales on the axes for the business and financial cycle indicators.
In this paper, I explore whether macro-financial linkages are asymmetric and, if so,
what generates these asymmetries.
I contribute to the existing literature in three ways. Firstly, I provide evidence suggesting
that financial shocks have an asymmetric e ect on real variables. I construct a Bayesian Markov-
Switching VAR (MS-VAR) and compare the e ects of a positive financial shock in normal times
to a negative shock during credit constrained periods using euro area data. Secondly, using a
structural model, I explore the reasons behind the asymmetric macro-financial transmission.
The model features a heterogeneous banking sector as in Gerali et al. (2010) and an occasionally
binding borrowing constraint as in Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015a). By including a banking
sector and occasionally binding borrowing constraints on the side of entrepreneurs, I match the
empirical characteristics of the euro area financial sector more closely. Importantly, it also allows
me to distinguish between the borrowers’ balance sheet channel and the bank balance sheet
channel. I use the method of Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015a) to solve and estimate the non-linear
model. Finally, I study whether countercyclical monetary and macroprudential policies could
respectively. As in Borio et al. (1994), I assume that the building to land ratio is roughly 2:1.
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be welfare improving, once the observed non-linearities are accounted for. While studies have
shown that these policies can be costly in boom times (see e.g. Adrian and Liang, 2014 and
Svensson, 2014), this might not necessarily hold true in a non-linear framework.
I find that the output response to a positive shock in unconstrained times is three times
smaller than a negative shock during constrained episodes. The MS-VAR also shows that loans
fall significantly during constrained periods, but respond little to a positive shock in normal
times. Inflation is mostly una ected by financial shocks and is independent of the state of the
economy. The structural model closely matches the stylised facts, which were detected by the
MS-VAR and indicates that the asymmetric transmission of financial shocks is mainly due to
the borrowers’ balance sheet channel. In addition, I find that countercyclical capital bu ers can
be welfare improving and more e ective in increasing the consumption welfare of households
than comparable ‘leaning-against-the-wind’-type Taylor rules (LATW).
While the links between the financial sector and the real economy have been closely scrutinised
in recent years, there are only a few studies that have looked at non-linearities in the macro-
financial relationship.
The first part of this paper is closely related to work by Hubrich et al. (2013) and Hartmann
et al. (2015). Both papers explore the relationship between financial shocks and the macroeconomy
in the euro area, and find evidence in favour of non-linearities in a regime-switching VAR with
a financial stress indicator. In addition to using a larger sample period, my paper di ers by
allowing the switching to take place based upon the di erent states of the credit cycle, rather
than upon the financial stress regimes. Credit conditions were also used in Calza and Sousa
(2006) to determine regimes in a threshold VAR. Using a sample that ends in 2002, they find
stronger financial spillover e ects for credit cycle downturns than upturns. These e ects are
shown to be more pronounced in the US than in the euro area.
The structural model is closely linked to Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015a), which however
focuses on housing shocks and household borrowing in the US. In my model, the presence of
an explicit banking sector, credit supply friction, and capital creates additional feedback loops
between the real economy and the financial sector.3 The asymmetric role of financial frictions
are also investigated in Del Negro and Schorfheide (2013) and Lindé et al. (2016). Whereas
the former paper evaluates the individual forecast performance of the basic Smets-Wouters
model versus the same model augmented with financial frictions, the latter paper estimates a
non-linear, regime-switching DSGE model. Both papers find that financial frictions become
more important, once the economy has entered a stress state. Relative to the latter paper, I
introduce an occasionally binding constraint, which allows me to endogenise the switch between
normal and credit constrained times.
3For an extensive review of the literature on macro-financial linkages in DSGE models, see Gerke et al. (2013).
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This chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 empirically analyses whether the macro-
financial relationship is asymmetric using a MS-VAR. Section 3 briefly describes a structural
model with financial frictions and occasionally binding constraints, the solution and estimation
methods, and studie the fit of the model to the euro area data. Section 4 uses the estimated
structural model to examine asymmetries in the macro-financial linkages. Section 5 studies
the welfare properties of countercyclical macroprudential and monetary policy rules. Section 6
concludes.
2.2 Empirical Model
In this section, I use a Markov-Switching SVAR to investigate whether the transmission of
financial shocks is asymmetric. For simplicity, I assume that there are two states of the
world: (i) a normal state where households and firms are able to freely borrow and (ii) a credit
constrained state in which credit to households and firms is limited, possibly because of binding
borrowing constraints.




, interest rate, i
t
, loans to
private sector growth, b
t
, and asset price growth, q
t
. Loans to the private sector capture the
credit channel.
All data is monthly and collected from the ECB Statistical Warehouse for the euro area.
Industrial production and the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) measure output
and inflation, respectively. I use the EONIA (Euro OverNight Index Average) rate as a proxy for
interest rates. The EONIA rate is the rate at which banks provide loans to each other for the
duration of one day. It is a more useful measure of the interest rate than the main refinancing
rate, as it moves closely with the main refinancing rate in normal times, but has the added
benefit of also responding to changes in liquidity moves, when unconventional monetary policy
measures are implemented. In addition, unlike the main refinancing rate, the EONIA can enter
into negative territory, which it does at the end of the sample. The loan growth rate to euro
area non-monetary financial institutions measures credit growth in the private sector. The Euro
Stoxx 50 represents asset prices. Output, the HICP, loans, and asset prices are reported in
annual growth rates and the interest rate in first di erences. The sample spans the period from
September 1999 until April 2016.
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2.2.1 Model Specification and Estimation
The model is estimated using Bayesian methods (see Krolzig, 1997). All coe cients are assumed
to be regime-variant. Regime-dependent intercepts, A0s, are important to inspect the average
di erences depending on the state of the credit cycle, while regime-variant autoregressive
coe cients, A
i,s
, can track di erences in the transmission channels. I also allow for Markov-
Switching in the variance, Á
t
, to account for the likely increase in variance of financial variables
during the credit constrained state, which could otherwise bias my coe cient estimates. The
states are s
t
= {N, C}, where N is a normal state, and C a credit constrained state. To identify
the states, I restrict the level of credit growth to be larger in the normal state than in the credit









for the credit growth variable, where p is the
number of lags. The transition probabilities between the states are assumed to be constant, so
























To keep the model parsimonious, I use p = 1 for the autoregressive annual rates, and a constant
in terms of deterministic variables. I estimate the model by employing a 4-step Gibbs sampler
procedure, in which I first compute the states and then draw for the transition probabilities, the
coe cients, and the variance. The algorithm I use is the following:
1. Use a filter-smoothing algorithm to determine the states sl|y, Al≠1 (Frühwirth-Schnatter,
2006).
2. Draw transition probabilities pl|sl from a Dirichlet distribution.
3. Draw regime dependent intercepts and constant coe cients Al
s




4. Draw regime dependent covariance matrices ql
s
|y, sl, pl, Al
s
from an Inverse Wishart
distribution.
l is the number of sample draws, and y the data. The priors for the parameters are stated in
each step of the algorithm. The initial 1000 draws are discarded as burn-in and the remaining
chain is thinned by recording only every 25th draw to avoid excessive autocorrelation between
the draws, which would otherwise slow down the convergence to the posterior distribution.
I initialise the algorithm by assuming that credit growth is positive in the normal state
a
N
0,4 > 0, and the initial transition probability of remaining and switching states is given by 0.9
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and 0.1, respectively. This makes the states themselves persistent, and comparable with the
results of the structural model. I report the identified states and the first two moments of the
variables in the two states in Figure A.1 and Table A.1. The credit constrained state is identified
around the year 2000 to 2004, after the dot-com collapse, and then again from 2008 to 2014
during the financial and sovereign debt crises. As expected, the mean of each variable during
the constrained state is significantly lower than during the normal state, and the variance for
each variable is more than twice as large.
My main interest is to examine whether the credit channel (proxied by loans to
the private sector) is weaker and the real economy less a ected, when financial markets are
booming and credit is expanding, than it would be the case when financial conditions are
deteriorating. In other words, I want to examine how the financial sector passes-through
positive financial shocks to the real economy in normal times relative to negative financial shocks
in credit constrained times.
I identify financial shocks by applying a recursive identification scheme on the contemporan-
eous coe cient matrix. I divide variables into fast and slow moving, in which asset prices belong
to the first group and the macroeconomic variables belong to the second group. The interest
rate, as a monetary policy proxy, reacts both to output and inflation contemporaneously. Loans
are assumed to be slower than asset prices, since banks’ credit conditions need time to adjust.
Hence, the order of the variables follows: output, inflation, interest rate, loans, and asset prices.
The shock of interest is an unexpected, exogenous shock to asset price growth. The exogeneity
assumption holds well, as many of the financial shocks in this sample originated from the outside
the euro area (e.g. the dot-com bubble, Financial Crisis in 2008 emerged from the US).
2.2.2 The Results
To examine the dynamics across states, I report the impulse responses and the contribution
of asset price growth shocks to the forecast error variance of output. I compare the responses
of a positive shock in a normal state to a negative shock in a constrained state. The reason
for looking at these specific shocks is that financial booms usually occur, when credit is easily
available and the financial sector is hit by positive surprises, while financial busts coincide with
a tightening of credit supply and negative, unexpected shocks to financial markets.
Because the model is non-linear, impulse responses are constructed using conditional forecasts.
I apply the methodology of Koop et al. (1996) in which the responses are computed by subtracting
the forecast that is conditional only on the history of the model, F
t≠1, from the forecast which
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is also conditional on the sign of the shock, ‘
t








t≠1, ‘t, st, ·) = E(yt+· |Ft≠1, ‘t < 0, st = C) ≠ E(yt+· |Ft≠1).
This methodology is particularly suited to compute impulse responses in my case, as they
allow for non-linear e ects due to the sign or the magnitude of the shock. I calculate conditional
forecasts 50 times per draw and then average the impulse response,  , over the repetitions and
compute the credible set using the 16th and 84th percentile of the Monte Carlo draws. Figure
2.2 shows the results for a normalised financial shock that lasts for one period.
Most variables move as expected. Output, inflation, the interest rate, loans and asset prices
all rise following a positive financial shock (in blue), and fall following a negative financial shock
(in red).
Figure 2.2: Impulse Responses to a Financial Shock
Note: The shaded regions report point-wise 68% credible sets. The financial shock is normalised to 1% of asset
price growth and imposed for one period.
The figure shows clear asymmetry both in the financial market and in the macroeconomic
responses. For example, the negative shock on asset prices in credit constrained times persists
more than the equivalent positive shock during normal times. This asymmetry is also evident in
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the responses of loans. When credit conditions are slack, a positive shock does little to increase
loan growth. However, when credit is already restricted, a negative shock causes loans to fall
significantly and persistently. Thus, it seems that the credit channel, represented here by the
dynamics of loans, only operates significantly in the credit constrained scenario for the negative
shock.
The macroeconomic responses show a similar pattern. Output falls more than three times as
much as it rises, indicating a very strong and significant asymmetric behaviour of the macro-
financial linkages. Inflation dynamics do not seem to di er significantly in the two scenarios,
and are a ected by a large degree of uncertainty in the responses. The e ect on the interest rate
is significantly negative and persistent in the negative scenario. In the normal state, the interest
rate rises, although by a smaller amount.
To sum up, there seems to be evidence of asymmetries in the responses of financial markets
to positive and negative shocks, and in the transmission to the real economy, making financial
booms smaller than financial busts.
The weaker role of the financial sector during normal times is confirmed by looking at the
forecast error variance decomposition. Table 2.1 reports the variance decomposition in the
normal state and the constrained state (in italics) for output growth. The most striking di erence
is between the medium-term e ects of financial shocks on output. In the normal state, financial
shocks only explain roughly 10% of output growth over the 1-5 year horizon. However, in the
credit constrained state, financial shocks explain almost one third of output growth variation
highlighting again the asymmetry of macro-financial linkages.













1 month 100 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 months 96.69 99.05 0.80 0.04 1.41 0.06 0.23 0.07 0.60 0.70
1 year 52.84 61.50 21.15 1.35 7.35 2.27 2.92 1.95 11.05 30.62
2 years 28.63 51.17 42.52 3.04 6.33 2.38 3.88 5.89 11.77 32.13
5 years 15.53 49.32 48.83 4.72 6.92 3.34 5.56 7.18 10.34 31.92
Note: The left hand side number of the column represents the variance decomposition in the
normal state, the right hand side number in italics displays the results for the constrained state.
The values are in percentages and represent the median draw of the Gibbs sampler.
Limitations: Disentangling the Credit Channel As the VAR only includes loans and
thus only allows us to look at the aggregate movement of credit, it is di cult to understand
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the exact transmission mechanism in the data. The credit channel can be disentangled into two
components (a) the borrowers’ balance sheet channel, and (b) the bank balance sheet channel.
The borrowers’ balance sheet channel typically arises due to the asymmetric information problem
and the unenforceability of contracts between lenders and borrowers which gives rise to an
external finance premium (Bernanke et al., 1999) and collateral requirements (Kiyotaki and
Moore, 1997). In contrast, the bank balance sheet channel is related to banks’ inability to bu er
their loan supply in times of adverse shocks and dependence of borrowers on these loans.
Figure 2.3: Credit Indicator


















Bank Lending Borrower Balance Sheet
Source: Ciccarelli et al. (2014) and author’s own calculations based on the ECB’s quarterly Bank
Lending Survey of Professional Forecasters. The y-axis represents the di erence between the
net percentage of forecasters responding that conditions with regard to supply lending (bank
lending) and borrower’s quality (balance sheet) have tightened to the ones who respond that
credit conditions have eased. The blue, dotted line represents the bank lending indicator, and
the red, solid line indicates the balance sheet indicator.
For policy purposes, it is useful to understand which of these channels plays a greater role
in the transmission of financial shocks to the real economy. Survey data can provide an initial
clue about the relative importance of the two channels over time. I use the quarterly Bank
Lending Survey of the ECB to split the qualitative responses of financial institutions to changes
in their loan supply into answers regarding bank lending versus balance sheet conditions. I then
construct two indicators by measuring the di erence between the net percentage of forecasters
that have responded that conditions regarding lending supply (bank lending) and borrowers’
quality (borrowers’ balance sheet) have tightened versus eased as in Ciccarelli et al. (2014).
Figure 2.3 shows the two indicators. While both indicators run relatively in parallel during
normal times, the borrowers’ balance sheet indicator falls faster and is clearly more negative
during more credit constrained episodes than the bank lending indicator. As this corresponds
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to the asymmetric response of loans in Figure 2.2, presumably, the borrowers’ balance sheet
seems to play a greater role for the observed asymmetry in the macro-financial transmission.
However, it should be noted that due to the self-reporting by banks, banks are more likely to
over-emphasise the borrower channel and potentially skew the survey results in their favour.
The structural model I use in the next section provides firmer evidence that it is indeed the
borrowers’ balance sheet channel which is more important.
2.3 DSGE Model
To understand the asymmetric transmission of financial shocks in financial markets and the real
economy, I use a structural model. The model has two main features: (i) an occasionally binding
borrowing constraint to allow for di erent states of the world, and (ii) a detailed financial sector
that allows me to distinguish between the borrower and the bank balance sheet channel. The
model is an extension of the work by Gambacorta and Signoretti (2014), which in turn builds
upon the banking model of Gerali et al. (2010). The financial sector in the model has two main
characteristics: (i) a target leverage ratio and quadratic adjustment costs for banks, which gives
rise to credit supply frictions, and (ii) a borrowing constraint for entrepreneurs which requires
them to provide capital as a collateral, and thus creates credit demand frictions. The borrowing
constraint is the crucial link between the financial sector and the real economy, as it introduces
the ‘financial accelerator’ mechanism into the model: when a negative financial shock occurs,
capital income falls, so that capital is less worth as a collateral. As a consequence, borrowers
have to reduce their borrowing which causes investment and output to fall.
The model I use is to a large extent similar to Gambacorta and Signoretti (2014) except
for two key changes. Firstly, I allow for the borrowing constraint of the entrepreneurs to be
occasionally binding. As in the empirical model, there are two states of the world: one state in
which the borrowing constraint is binding and credit conditions are tight, and another state in
which the constraint is slack and agents can borrow unlimitedly.
Secondly, I consider a larger number of shocks to analyse the e ects of disturbances in the
financial sector and estimate the model. In addition to a standard technology and a cost-push
shock, I introduce a monetary policy shock and two financial shocks: (i) a shock to the loan-
to-value (LTV) ratio of entrepreneurs, and (ii) a net worth (default) shock. A shock to the
LTV ratio is often described as a credit squeeze or risk perception shock. A positive shock (an
increase in the loan-to-value ratio) allows entrepreneurs to borrow more for the same amount
of collateral and vice versa. A net worth shock instead redistributes wealth between borrowers
and lenders. The shock enters the budget constraint of both entrepreneurs and banks. Both of
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these shocks are modelled to be exogenous from conditions in the Euro Area to capture the idea
that they represent global shocks (originating e.g. from the US) which however still a ect the
balance sheet and risk perceptions of European firms and banks.
2.3.1 Description of the Model
The model contains several agents: patient households, impatient entrepreneurs, retailers,
wholesale and retail banks, capital goods producers, and a central bank. There is one type of
households, which are patient and provide labour to impatient entrepreneurs. The entrepreneurs
produce intermediate goods that are sold to retailers competitively. These retailers di erentiate
the intermediate goods and sell them with a mark-up to households, who also own the retailers
and keep their profits. Banks have two branches: a wholesale and a retail branch. Wholesale
banks take deposits from households and operate under perfect competition. Retail banks are
monopolistic and give out loans to entrepreneurs for a mark-up. In addition, they take and
monitor collateral from the entrepreneurs given an LTV ratio. There is also a central bank that
sets the policy rate and determines the capital-asset ratio for banks, which is fixed. Finally, in
order to derive a price for capital, there are capital producers who buy undepreciated capital
from entrepreneurs and re-sell it for a new price back to entrepreneurs taking into account
quadratic adjustment costs. The borrowers’ balance sheet channel is captured by the borrowing
constraint of the entrepreneurs and a ects credit conditions via the net worth of the borrower.
The bank balance sheet channel describes credit supply on the lenders’ side via the leverage





























is labour supply, —
P
is the patient discount factor. They deposit
savings at wholesale banks, for which they receive a risk-free return. They also own retail firms,










+ (1 + rib
t≠1)dt≠1 + JRt , (2.3)
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where d
t
are bank deposits, w
t
is the real wage, and rib
t
is the short term policy rate. JR
t
are the
profits of the retail sector and „ is the elasticity of labour. The first-order condition yields the
















Households also provide labour to the entrepreneurs for the production of intermediate goods,










Entrepreneurs need to borrow from banks and hold capital, but also produce goods, employ
households and consume. They form the link between the real economy and the banking sector
and are thus important for generating a feedback loop between the financial and macroeconomic



















with respect to their consumption, cE
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, labour demand, ld
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, and bank loans, bE
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. The optimisation
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t≠1 + ‘bt , (2.7)
where rb
t
is the interest rate on bank loans, kE
t
is the entrepreneurs stock of capital, qk
t
is the
price of capital, and yE
t









relative competitive price of the intermediate good produced by the entrepreneur, and ”k is
the depreciation rate of capital. The net worth shock, ‘B
t
, enters the budget constraint of the
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entrepreneurs by altering their income. It follows an AR(1) process with an i.i.d shock Áb
t
and a


















is the stochastic LTV ratio which follows an AR(1) process with an i.i.d shock Áme
t
and variance ‡me. A high LTV ratio implies that banks can lend more for the same amount of
collateral and vice versa. The borrowing constraint determines how much entrepreneurs can




ensures that the borrowing constraint is
binding and credit is constrained in the economy. However, with larger shocks the constraint
becomes slack.
Entrepreneurs do not work but use capital and labour in the production of intermediate
goods. As in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), capital has many functions in this model and thus
establishes another important feedback mechanism between the real economy and the financial
sector. Capital is used (i) in the production of intermediate goods, (ii) as a collateral for
the entrepreneurs, and (iii) as a source of funds for investment. The production function for















is stochastic and follows an AR(1)
process with an i.i.d. technology shock Áa
t
with variance ‡a. Entrepreneurs operate under perfect


















This is similar to the households’ Euler equation but di ers by the Lagrange multiplier on
the borrowing constraint, ⁄E
t
, which represents the marginal value of one unit of additional
borrowing. Another di erence is that entrepreneurs, unlike households, discount at a higher rate
and face the higher bank loan rate, rb
t
, rather than the risk-free rate, rib
t
. The labour demand
schedule is
63











The investment Euler equation equalises the marginal benefit with the marginal cost of saving
capital. As capital also serves as collateral, the equation also depends on the Lagrange multiplier














































The banking sector is divided into a perfectly competitive wholesale and a monopolistic retail
sector. The wholesale sector maximises bank profits by optimising the net interest margin
between the loan and deposit rate subject to the quadratic adjustment costs of deviating from a






























To simplify, I set the deposit rate equal to the risk-free rate set by the central bank. Wholesale
banks are subject to a balance sheet constraint that can also be interpreted as a capital adequacy
constraint. Loans have to be backed up by su cient bank capital and deposits at the beginning






t+1] = dt + Kbt . (2.15)
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Leverage generates a feedback between the interest rate spread and the real economy. Áb
t
is the
same net worth shock as in (2.7) that transfers wealth between entrepreneurs and banks. It is




is the banks’ capital and ◊ is the parameter for capital adjustment cost for banks. Combining






























The retail bank on the other hand, repackages the wholesale loans and charges a mark-up, µb,







The retail banks have market power, which helps them to adjust their lending in response to
shocks or cycles. Another crucial determinant for the feedback loop between the banking sector








t≠1(1 ≠ ”b) + JBt≠1. (2.18)
Since it is procyclical, bank capital worsens, when output declines due to decreasing banks’
profits. The latter is defined as the sum of both the retail and wholesale sector profits on loans

























Retailers and Capital Good Producers
The monopolistic retailers are di erentiating the intermediate goods produced by the
entrepreneurs at no cost and sell them with a mark-up, x
t
. However, retailers face quadratic price
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. The firm’s mark-up, mky, is stochastic and follows an
AR(1) process with the autocorrelation coe cient fl
mk






Capital good producers are perfectly competitive and their main task is to transform the old,
undepreciated capital from entrepreneurs to new capital without any additional costs. They
then resell the new capital to the entrepreneurs in the next period at price P k
t
, so that the real







. In addition, capital producers ‘invest’ in the final goods bought from
retailers, which are not consumed by household, and also transform these into new capital.
The final goods to capital transformation is subject to quadratic adjustment costs that are
parameterised by Ÿ
i
, the investment adjustment cost parameter. The first-order condition of






















































with capital evolving according to
K
t
















Monetary policy follows a standard Taylor rule, so that the policy rate is set according to
1 + rib
t




































is an i.i.d monetary policy shock with variance ‡r. The monetary policy authority is also
responsible for setting a target leverage ratio for banks to avoid an over-leveraging of the economy
similar to the real world Basel capital ratios.
Market Clearing and Aggregation








as it is a closed economy with no government intervention.
2.3.2 Solving and Estimating the Model
Because the entrepreneurs’ borrowing constraint is occasionally binding, I need to apply non-
standard solution and estimation methods. Disregarding non-linearities in the borrowing
constraint, as is often done in the literature, would lead to a symmetric transmission mechanism
and symmetric feedback from financial variables over the credit cycle. If we were to assume that
borrowing constraints were always binding, we would also need to believe that the discount factor
of impatient agents is higher than the discount factor of patient agents, and that shocks are so
small, that the economy does not move too far from its steady state level. This assumption is
often violated in practise, since financial shocks can wipe out a large percentage of asset prices
in a very short time.
Solution Method
I use the method of Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015b) which uses a piece-wise linear approach
to approximate the global solution. The idea behind the method is to treat the binding and
non-binding scenario as two separate regimes for which a first-order approximation can be used.
One of the requirements for this method to work accurately is that the system is always expected
to return to the initial regime in finite time. As we have seen with in Section 2, this requirement
is not particularly restrictive, as state switching between the constrained and unconstrained
credit regimes is relatively common in the data. Also, it is consistent with the notion that credit
constrained periods are expected to proceed times of credit expansions. While the method is
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unable to capture any anticipatory e ects, it has some key advantages over fully fledged global
methods: It is computationally fast and can be applied to non-linear models with a large number
of state variables, for which global methods would otherwise be infeasible. Moreover, Guerrieri
and Iacoviello (2015b) show that the di erence between the piecewise-linear solution method
and a global solution method is quantitatively small in selected examples and that the solutions
are very accurate for models with occasionally binding constraints.
Data















of the model. The data is reported quarterly from 1999Q1 until 2016Q2. I use euro area GDP
for Y
t
, inflation based on the HICP for fi
t
, the EONIA rate for rib
t
, an index for the notional
stock of loans to the private sector for b
t
, and the EURO STOXX 50 equity price index for asset
prices, q
t
. The data is detrended using a one-sided Hedrick-Prescott filter, except for the interest
rate and inflation, which are demeaned and divided by 400% to express quarterly rates.4 The
smoothing parameter is set to ⁄ = 1600 to compute the quarterly business cycle component.
Calibration and Priors
Not all parameters of the model are estimated. Those that are calibrated are reported in
Table A.2. It is important to properly calibrate the two discount factors, as they are crucial
for the dynamics of the model with an occasionally binding borrowing constraint. The more
impatient the entrepreneurs are relative to the patient households (the smaller —
E
), the more
they discount future consumption and value an additional unit of borrowing, thus the larger the
Lagrange multiplier on borrowing ⁄
t
E. The increase in the Lagrange multiplier in turn causes
the borrowing constraint to become more binding and makes it less likely for it to become slack
unless very large shocks occur. For the impatient discount factor, I use a value of —
E
= 0.975
based on Iacoviello (2005) and a slightly higher patient discount factor of —
p
= 0.9943 based on
Gerali et al. (2010). The latter is computed by matching the mean, monthly deposit rate on M2
in the euro area.
I calibrate the target capital-to-loans ratio, ‹ = 0.09 in line with the Basel Accords. I follow
Gerali et al. (2010) for the entrepreneur’s steady state LTV ratio, mE
ss
= 0.35 which is in line with
the values for non-financial corporations in the euro area (firms’ LTV ratio is significantly lower
than households), and use their estimated value for the bank capital adjustment cost of ◊ = 11.
The other calibrated parameters for labour elasticity, the steady state values for marginal costs
4The one-sided filter has the advantage that it is strictly backward-looking, so that only past information is
used to separate the trend and cyclical component without changing the timing of information and of the shock.
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and mark-up, the capital share, and the deprecation rate of capital are set to standard values
in the literature for the euro area (see e.g. Gambacorta and Signoretti, 2014). To model the
macro-financial transmission channels as close as possible to the data, I estimate the parameters
for price stickiness, the investment adjustment cost, the monetary policy parameters, and the
shock parameters.
Estimation
For the estimation, I use relatively non-informative prior values for the chosen parameters as
reported in Table 2.2. To construct the likelihood I follow Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015a) and
use the piecewise-linear solution from the previous step. The Bayesian estimation follows a
random walk Metropolis-Hastings algorithm in which the likelihood is computed by solving for
the errors recursively. The main advantage of this method is that it is computationally faster
and more feasible for a larger state space than (i) the Kalman filter approach or (ii) particle
filter methods.
















}, which are drawn
drawn from a multivariate Normal distribution, given the past unobserved components, X
t≠1
and the current realisation of Y
t
. Due to the unobserved components, the filter requires initial
values for X0 that represent the steady state values of the model. For that purpose, I use the
first ten observations. Once the filtered errors are computed, the next step is to evaluate the
log-likelihood

















I can use a short-cut in the computation of the Jacobian matrix, ˆÁt
ˆY
t
. From the piecewise-






t≠1,Át))≠1 and the local linearity of the solution
guarantees the invertibility of the Jacobian matrix during the implicit di erentiation step.
By combining prior information with the likelihood and maximising it using a random walk
Metropolis-Hastings algorithm, I get the posterior parameter estimates.
The advantages of this method are two-fold: On the one hand, the method only requires
an initial guess whether the constraint in the model is binding or not, so that convergence is
easier achieved than having to guess the path of all endogenous variables. On the other hand,
the algorithm is comparatively fast, since the Jacobian matrix that is needed to compute the
likelihood is already provided as a by-product of the solution method.
I restrict the choice of parameters for estimation to the parameter for price stickiness, Ÿ
P
,
investment adjustment cost, Ÿ
i






























is important to estimate rather than calibrate, as it determines the feedback loop
between asset prices and output. As can be seen from Eq. (2.21), the smaller Ÿ
i
is, the more
responsive are capital good producers to changes in asset prices. Previous calibration values of
this parameter are very imprecise and diverge by a factor of 100 (Gambacorta and Signoretti,
2014), so that estimation can provide valuable information. To improve the e ciency of the
algorithm, I estimate the model with a strictly binding borrowing constraint using standard
Bayesian methods first and use these values as starting values for the algorithm. The results are
reported in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2: Estimated Parameters
Parameters Description Prior Mean Posterior Mean Posterior std Prior shape Prior std
Ÿp Price stickiness 20.00 85.9940 0.0056 Gamma 10.00
Ÿi Investment adj. cost 5.00 11.2019 0.0039 Gamma 2.50
„fi Taylor rule on fi 2.00 6.0229 0.0004 Gamma 1.00
„y Taylor rule on y 0.10 0.1905 0.0018 Normal 0.15
AR Coe cients
flA Technology 0.80 0.9896 0.0006 Beta 0.10
flmk Mark-up 0.80 0.8359 0.0007 Beta 0.10
flib Taylor rule 0.75 0.6082 0.0008 Beta 0.10
flme LTV ratio 0.80 0.8164 0.0009 Beta 0.10
flB Net worth 0.80 0.9167 0.0005 Beta 0.10
Standard Errors
‡A Technology 0.01 0.0157 0.0003 Inv.Gamma 0.50
‡mk Mark-up 0.01 0.0646 0.0005 Inv.Gamma 0.50
‡r Taylor rule 0.01 0.0248 0.0010 Inv.Gamma 0.50
‡me LTV ratio 0.01 0.0225 0.0007 Inv.Gamma 0.50
‡B Net worth 0.01 0.0198 0.0001 Inv.Gamma 0.50
Note: The posterior statistics are based on 50 000 draws from the random walk Metropolis-Hastings algorithm.
Starting values were chosen based on the estimated parameters of the model with a permanently binding
borrowing constraint. The first 50% of draws are discarded as burn-in.
The parameters seem reasonably well identified and mostly driven by the likelihood component
of the posterior distribution. The parameter for investment adjustment cost is similar to what
has been found in Gerali et al. (2010) (Ÿ
i
= 10.26). However, the price stickiness parameter is
notably larger than in the previous literature. One explanation for the high Ÿ
p
is the lack of
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wage stickiness in the model, so that Ÿ
p
is soaking up the additional stickiness that is present in
the data. Since I use the EONIA rate as the observable interest rate, the Taylor parameter on
inflation, „
fi
, reacts more strongly to movement in prices. Overall, the estimates of the standard
parameter are in line with what is known in the literature. In addition, I can now also provide a
more precise value of the investment adjustment cost parameter that is crucial in determining
macro-financial spillovers.
2.3.3 Validation
To assess the theoretical model, I evaluate its ability to (i) capture asymmetries, and (ii)
reproduce the macro-financial transmission described in Section 2.
For the asymmetries, I compare how well the DSGE model manages to identify the credit
constrained and unconstrained state. Figure A.1 reports the probability of being in the credit
constrained state both in the MS-VAR and in the DSGE model. The identified states in both
models are almost identical. Both models identify an unconstrained state approximately between
2004 and 2008 and then again for a period starting in 2014. A credit constrained episode is
identified from 2000 to 2004, from 2008 to 2014 in the period of the financial and sovereign
debt crises, and in the last few periods of the sample. It appears that the regimes identified
by the MS-VAR proceeds the states identified in the model by one or two months and are
marginally more persistent for the unconstrained state. Overall, the model performs well along
this dimension.
For the macro-financial transmission, I compare the monthly VAR impulse responses with the
VAR impulse responses based on simulated data from my model. As the model is estimated using
quarterly data, I need to re-calibrate the time-varying parameters to a monthly frequency before
simulating the data.5 I draw errors for the five shocks from a normal distribution with zero mean
and the estimated standard deviation of the shocks. I then simulate the observable variables














], 100 times and feed the averaged data into the same
MS-VAR algorithm as in Section 2. Figure A.2 reports the results. The model performs well
in matching the response of output, asset prices, and loans. The credible sets of the responses
with the simulated data fully include the responses of the model with the real data. The only
dimension for which the model seems to be unsuccessful is in replicating the response of inflation
and as a consequence interest rates: both are insignificant with the simulated data. Note however
that this was also the case for the empirical responses of the annual inflation and given how
5The time-varying parameters in the model are the discount factors, the AR coe cients of the error processes,
the depreciation rate, and the price and investment adjustment costs. To convert these parameters to a monthly
frequency, I take the discount rates and AR coe cients to the power of one third, divide the deprecation rate by
three and multiply the adjustment costs times three (Pfeifer, 2013).
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quantitatively small the responses are, this failure is of little consequence for the macro-financial
transmission.
Overall, the results of the DSGE model are largely consistent with the empirical results of
the MS-VAR, and both asymmetries, as well as macro-financial transmission are well accounted
for.
2.4 The Transmission of Financial Shocks
Using the estimated model, I study the transmission properties of two financial shocks: an LTV
ratio shock, Áme
t
and a net worth shock, Áb
t
. Both shocks a ect the entrepreneurs’ ability to
borrow. However, they di er significantly in the way they impact loans. The LTV shock a ects
the supply of loans that banks can give to entrepreneurs via the LTV ratio, mE
t
, as seen in (2.8).
Instead, the net worth shock a ects the demand and supply of loans via the budget constraints
of both entrepreneurs and banks.
The advantage of using the model is in the ability to dissect the credit channel into its two
components: the borrower and the bank balance sheet channels. The bank balance sheet channel
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The question is which of these channels is dominant in producing asymmetries between the
financial system and the real economy in di erent states.
2.4.1 LTV Ratio Shock
Figure 2.4 shows the response of the model to a one standard deviation shock to the entrepreneurs’
LTV ratio. A positive shock (with a slack borrowing constraint) is in blue, and a negative
shock (with a binding borrowing constraint) is the dotted, red line. The left column reports




, and the Lagrange
multiplier on the borrowing constraint, ⁄E
t
, while the right column represents the responses of
the financial sector. In particular, the general response of loans, b
t
, is further broken up into
(i) the response of the leverage ratio of banks, lev
t




A positive shock to the LTV ratio causes the borrowing constraint in (2.8) to become slack,
as entrepreneurs can borrow more for less collateral. As banks can now supply more loans, total
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loans increase. The ability to borrow more for less capital leads to an increase in the entrepreneurs’
net worth. Also, since banks do not back up the additional loans with an equivalent amount of
bank capital, their leverage ratio decreases. On the macroeconomic side, current consumption
and production increase. Entrepreneurs are able to consume more, and have more capital to
invest. The additional consumption drives up the production of intermediate goods, the demand
for labour, and, in turn, consumption and employment of households increase. Overall, total
consumption and output in the economy rise.
The opposite holds true for a negative LTV shock: with entrepreneurs having to provide
more collateral for the same amount of loans, an additional unit of borrowing becomes more
expansive and loans decrease, leading to the opposite reaction and a fall in the macroeconomic
variables.
Figure 2.4: Responses to an LTV Financial Shock
Note: The blue line indicates a positive shock, while the red dotted line represents a negative shock. The
financial shock is a one standard deviation shock to the LTV ratio, which raises the LTV ratio by 2.2 percentage
points. The parameters and standard error are set to the posterior mean. The shock is induced for 5 periods,
after which the series reverts back to its steady state.
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While the left-hand side of the figure looks similar to the one reported following an LTV
shock, the right-hand side and, particularly, the reaction of loans is di erent. The LTV shock
increases the LTV ratio and leads to an increase in loans. The net worth shock on the other
hand acts more like a shock to the demand of loans. When the borrowing constraint is binding
and a negative net worth shock hits he economy, entrepreneurs want to borrow more given
their increased marginal utility of borrowing, but can only borrow up to when the borrowing
constraint becomes binding.
As is apparent from Figure 2.4, the responses of the variables following a positive and negative
shock are clearly asymmetric due to the occasionally binding borrowing constraint. When the
constraint is binding, one additional unit of borrowing is associated with positive marginal
utility, ⁄E
t
> 0. In contrast, a slack constraint that follows from a positive financial shock causes
households to consume more today without the need to borrow, so that the marginal utility
of borrowing, ⁄E
t
, is zero. The agents are allowed to borrow more, but there is no additional
utility from borrowing. This is why loans increase by less for the positive scenario than they fall
for the negative case. With less demand for loans, the leverage ratio of banks also decreases
slightly less relative to the decrease from a negative shock, as banks are deleveraging faster in a
credit constrained scenario. Note also that the asymmetry in the net worth of entrepreneurs
(representing the borrowers’ balance sheet channel) is very large with a negative shock causing
net worth to fall three times more than it rises for a positive shock. The magnitude of the
di erence is similar to what we have seen in Figure 2.3.
This asymmetry is reflected in the size and shape of the responses of macroeconomic variables.
In terms of size, the responses between a positive and a negative shock di er depending on the
state of the world. A slack borrowing constraint following a positive shock causes entrepreneurs to
consume more. However, as the marginal utility of borrowing is zero and because of diminishing
marginal returns to consumption, their marginal utility of consumption decreases, so that
consumption spending increases only by a small amount. As in Section 2, output increases only
incrementally following a positive shock and three times less so than for a negative shock. When
the constraint is binding, the results di er. Consumption becomes more sensitive to changes in
the credit market, as the net worth of entrepreneurs falls more strongly. A negative financial
shock increases the marginal utility of borrowing, so that agents adjust their consumption more.
In terms of shape asymmetries, we can observe that the output, consumption, and the net
worth of entrepreneurs are less persistent and revert back quicker to the steady state after a




, reverts back to its steady state value quicker for a negative shock than for a positive shock
that causes the constraint to become slack.
In terms of the relative importance of the two transmission channels, even though both credit
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channels show some asymmetry, it is the borrowers’ balance sheet channel that reacts stronger
during a credit constrained regime and is responsible for the asymmetric pass-through to the real
economy. To provide further evidence for this claim, I run a simulation in which banks cannot
adjust their leverage ratio, therefore e ectively switching the bank balance sheet o . Figure A.3
shows the responses, when transmission is taking place exclusively via the borrowers’ balance
channel. The only noticeable di erence is that the response of leverage is zero. For all other
variables, the e ect of turning the channel o  is barely visible. Hence, we can conclude that it
is indeed the borrowers’ balance sheet channel that is driving the asymmetric macro-financial
transmission.
2.4.2 Net Worth Shock
Figure 2.5 shows the response of the model to a one standard deviation shock to the entrepreneur’s
net worth, Áb
t
. While this type of shock also a ects the entrepreneurs’ borrowing constraint, it
goes through the system di erently than the LTV shock.
In contrast, a positive net worth shock increases the wealth of entrepreneurs, so that even
when the constraint is slack, they do not need to borrow more to satisfy their current consumption,
as is shown in (2.7), and start to deleverage. Banks’ leverage ratio increases strongly, as banks
need to smooth out the losses caused by Áb
t
with bank capital, as can be seen in the capital
adequacy constraint in (2.15). For the net worth shock, the bank balance sheet channel is
reacting very strongly, albeit symmetrically.
While there are sizeable di erences between the responses of loans from the LTV and the
net worth shock, the responses of the macroeconomic variables and net worth are very similar
even in terms of magnitude. With a positive financial shock, entrepreneurs are richer, which
increases total consumption, and output. The net worth of entrepreneurs still responds very
asymmetrically, but the drop for a negative net worth shock is less dramatic than for a negative
LTV shock. Consumption is more persistent and the asymmetries are not as strong as with
the LTV shock, but they still follow a similar pattern. As the response of leverage is ten times
larger for a net worth shock, the bank balance sheet channel is quantitatively more important
for macro-financial transmission than under an LTV shock.
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Figure 2.5: Responses to a Net Worth Financial Shock
Note: The blue line indicates a positive shock, while the red dotted line represents a negative shock. The
financial shock is a one standard deviation shock to the entrepreneurs’ budget constraint. The parameters and
standard error are set to the posterior mean. The shock is induced for 5 periods, after which the series reverts
back to its steady state.
Figure A.4 shows the responses, when the bank balance sheet channel is switched o  and
only the borrowers’ balance sheet channel is responsible for the transmission of the financial
shock. The e ects are more visible than under an LTV shock. It is apparent that the bank
channel has a mitigating yet symmetric role on output volatility.
To sum up, the main driver for the asymmetry in macro-financial spillovers in response to
both shocks is the borrowers’ balance sheet channel.
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2.5 Monetary and Macroprudential Policies: A Welfare
Analysis
In this section, I analyse the e ects of two countercyclical policy measures: leaning-against-the-
wind (LATW) and countercyclical macroprudential capital bu ers (CCB). The advantages of
these policies are thought to be a reduction in (i) the probability and costs of financial crises,
and (ii) the volatility of the credit cycle (and therefore also the volatility of business cycles).
However, countercyclical policies have often been found to be too costly to implement, as they
can reduce the level of bank lending and output (see e.g. Svensson, 2014 for LATW or Van den
Heuvel, 2008, and BIS (2010) for CCB). In this section, I study whether this conclusion still
holds, when there are asymmetries in the transmission of financial shocks.
The idea of LATW-type monetary policy is that central banks smooth financial cycles and
stabilise asset prices by allowing the interest rate to vary with asset prices. To model it, I extend












so that the new monetary policy rule follows
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The concept behind a CCB is that the capital adequacy ratio is adjusted for a measure of
the financial cycle, which a ects the lending behaviour of banks throughout the credit cycle and
thus also dampens output volatility (Angelini et al., 2015). I follow the Basel III regulation and
set the target leverage ratio, ‹
t
, in (2.14) to be time-varying and follow a countercyclical rule
that depends on the credit-to-GDP ratio
‹
t
= (1 ≠ fl
v














For the calibration, of these two rules, I set the value of the autoregressive parameter in (2.28)
to be fl
v
= 0.9, to make the policy very persistent, once the target leverage for banks is changed.
The sensitivity of the capital ratio to the financial cycle is calibrated to ‰
‚
= 0.0129 to match an
average deviation of 0-2.5% from the steady state value, as is foreseen by Basel III. To provide a
fair comparison between the two policies, I calibrate the parameter of asset-leaning in (2.27), „
q
,
to match the policy impact e ect of the CCB rule on a negative shock on asset prices. This
yields „
q
= 0.00375 for the Taylor rule parameter.
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To evaluate the welfare e ects over the financial cycle, I calibrate the positive shock in an
unconstrained state and the negative shock in a constrained credit state to correspond to the
magnitude and duration of an average euro area credit cycle. Based on the asset price indicator
in Section 1, the average magnitude is 8.3% and -7.3% for a boom and bust, respectively, lasting
for roughly 4 years each. I follow Adam and Billi (2008) and Ascari and Ropele (2012) and
compute the consumption welfare gain of households, µú, as the percentage value that would
make the utility without countercyclical policies equivalent to the utility under the alternative









































)] ≠ 1. (2.30)
The consumption welfare gain, µ, then represents the percentage of consumption households
are gaining over one financial cycle in the euro area by adopting the alternative policy. The
welfare gain in household consumption from the monetary policy rule is -0.24%, while the
welfare gain from the macroprudential rule is positive, 2.14%.6 The fact that countercyclical
macroprudential policies can be welfare improving even without accounting for the reduction in
the probability and costs of potentially prevented financial crises, is crucial for policy making, as
the 2.14% can be considered as a lower bound for the actual welfare gain.
The di erence in the welfare e ects of the two policies is not surprising. Introducing an
additional asset-price component into the standard Taylor rule only dampens the response of
asset prices and does not a ect the shape of the response. The response of the remaining variables
in the financial sector is largely una ected by the modified monetary policy rule and only changes
the magnitude of the output and inflation responses. In contrast, adding macroprudential policy
alters the steady state of the model and a ects the responses of the financial sector as a whole.
As banks need to adjust their leverage ratio to meet the time-varying target, the variability of
leverage becomes much smaller and the variability of loans and the retail rate increase. This
6Note that in a linear model, the welfare e ects over the cycle would roughly be zero, as the welfare gains
in bust times would cancel out the symmetric welfare losses in boom times. The steady state of the baseline
model is the same under the new monetary policy rule, while introducing the macroprudential rule alters the
steady state level of consumption and labour. Using (2.30), the steady state welfare from CCB is 0.08% smaller
than under the baseline model. However, this implies that the transient welfare gain of introducing CCB is
2.14%-0.08% = 2.06%, and still positive.
78
Conclusion
means that the target leverage ratio increases during a downturn, which causes banks to increase
their lending rate and pass-on the higher costs to the consumers. By increasing lending spreads,
borrowers reduce their demand for loans, which translates into less real activity. The opposite
holds true for an upswing. Quantitatively, the reduction in the lending rate does not spur the
same response in real activity.
While both these policies are specifically calibrated to match real life situations and thus
not generalisable, the current analysis already provides a valuable insight into how asymmetric
macro-financial linkages can be exploited. Policy makers can design countercyclical policy
measures to reduce the volatility caused by the financial cycle without risking a substantial
reduction in output during boom times. Macroprudential policies are particularly more powerful,
as they a ect the financial transmission channels directly. This result is consistent with Bruneau
et al. (2016) who also find that macroprudential rules are preferred to a Taylor rule augmented
for housing.
2.6 Conclusion
I conclude that the macro-financial transmission of financial shocks is asymmetric. The pass-
through of a positive shock to the real economy is smaller during normal times than the pass-
through of a negative shock during constrained times. This result is obtained both empirically
in a MS-VAR, as well as in a structural, estimated DSGE model. In addition, the structural
model allows me to distinguish between the two di erent macro-financial channels, the bank
and borrowers’ balance sheet channels. I find that in particular the borrower balance sheet
channel plays a more dominant role in the asymmetry of the transmission, which is consistent
with survey data.
In terms of policy, my analysis shows that the asymmetry in macro-financial linkages can be
exploited by using countercyclical policies. Time-varying macroprudential capital bu er rules,
as suggested by Basel III, seem more consumption welfare improving than an equivalent LATW
policy, and actually constitute a welfare gain for households over the duration of the euro area
financial cycle. Given that the model is not even taking into account the added benefits of a
reduction in the probability and costs of financial crises, the welfare e ects are likely to be larger.
An interesting extension of this paper would be the inclusion of risk and the precautionary
savings motive. The risk channel a ects the decision of households and firms to delay their
consumption and investment. By extending the model with risk, it would be possible to analyse
the e ects of financial shocks on financial stability and give a more complete picture of macro-
financial linkages. It would make it possible to inspect the build-up of risky asset bubbles during
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financial booms and the benefits of countercyclical policies for the reduction of crisis probability.
Another interesting avenue would be to look at international macro-financial spillovers and
the role of domestic macroprudential policies. As financial markets operate globally, imposing
regulations can often have spillover e ects on other countries.
To sum up, this paper has provided strong evidence that there are asymmetries in the
transmission of shocks from the financial sector to the real economy. Neglecting these non-
linearities could have sizeable and distortionary e ects on policy recommendations, and should




Adam, K. and Billi, R. M. (2008). Monetary conservatism and fiscal policy. Journal of Monetary
Economics, 55(8):1376–1388.
Adrian, T. and Liang, N. (2014). Monetary Policy, Financial Conditions, and Financial Stability.
IMES Discussion Paper Series 14-E-13, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of
Japan.
Angelini, P., Clerc, L., Cúrdia, V., Gambacorta, L., Gerali, A., Locarno, A., Motto, R., Roeger,
W., Heuvel, S. V. d., and Vl ek, J. (2015). Basel III: Long-term Impact on Economic
Performance and Fluctuations. Manchester School, 83(2):217–251.
Ascari, G. and Ropele, T. (2012). Disinflation in a DSGE perspective: Sacrifice ratio or welfare
gain ratio? Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 36(2):169–182.
Bernanke, B. S., Gertler, M., and Gilchrist, S. (1999). The financial accelerator in a quantitative
business cycle framework. Handbook of Macroeconomics, Elsevier.
BIS (2010). Assessing the macroeconomic impact of the transition to stronger capital and
liquidity requirements - Final report.
Borio, C. (2014). The financial cycle and macroeconomics: What have we learnt? Journal of
Banking & Finance, 45:182–198.
Borio, C., Kennedy, N., and Prowse, S. (1994). Exploring aggregate asset price fluctuations
across countries: measurement, determinants and monetary policy implications. BIS Economic
Paper 40, Bank for International Settlements.
Bruneau, G., Christensen, I., and Meh, C. (2016). Housing Market Dynamics and Macroprudential
Policy. Sta  Working Paper 16-31, Bank of Canada.
Calza, A. and Sousa, J. (2006). Output and Inflation Responses to Credit Shocks: Are There
Threshold E ects in the Euro Area? Studies in Nonlinear Dynamics & Econometrics,
10(2):1–21.
Ciccarelli, M., Maddaloni, A., and Peydro, J. L. (2014). Trusting the Bankers: A New Look at
the Credit Channel of Monetary Policy. Review of Economic Dynamics.
Del Negro, M. and Schorfheide, F. (2013). DSGE Model-Based Forecasting. Handbook of
Economic Forecasting, Elsevier.
81
Chapter 2. Asymmetric Macro-Financial Spillovers
Drehmann, M., Borio, C., and Tsatsaronis, K. (2012). Characterising the financial cycle: don’t
lose sight of the medium term! BIS Working Paper 380, Bank for International Settlements.
Frühwirth-Schnatter, S. (2006). Finite Mixture and Markov Switching Models. Springer Science
& Business Media.
Gambacorta, L. and Signoretti, F. M. (2014). Should monetary policy lean against the wind?
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 43(C):146–174.
Gerali, A., Neri, S., Sessa, L., and Signoretti, F. M. (2010). Credit and Banking in a DSGE
Model of the Euro Area. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 42(s1):107–141.
Gerke, R., Jonsson, M., Kliem, M., Kolasa, M., Lafourcade, P., Locarno, A., Makarski, K.,
and McAdam, P. (2013). Assessing macro-financial linkages: A model comparison exercise.
Economic Modelling, 31(C):253–264.
Guerrieri, L. and Iacoviello, M. (2015a). Collateral constraints and macroeconomic asymmetries.
National Bank of Poland Working Paper 202, National Bank of Poland, Economic Institute.
Guerrieri, L. and Iacoviello, M. (2015b). OccBin: A toolkit for solving dynamic models with
occasionally binding constraints easily. Journal of Monetary Economics, 70(C):22–38.
Hartmann, P., Hubrich, K. S., Kremer, M., and Tetlow, R. J. (2015). Melting Down: Systemic
Financial Instability and the Macroeconomy. SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 2462567, Social
Science Research Network, Rochester, NY.
Hubrich, K., D’Agostino, A.,  ervená, M., Ciccarelli, M., Guarda, P., Haavio, M., Jeanfils, P.,
Mendicino, C., Ortega, E., Valderrama, M. T., and Valentinyiné Endrész, M. (2013). Financial
shocks and the macroeconomy: heterogeneity and non-linearities. Occasional Paper Series
143, European Central Bank.
Iacoviello, M. (2005). House Prices, Borrowing Constraints, and Monetary Policy in the Business
Cycle. American Economic Review, 95(3):739–764.
Iacoviello, M. (2015). Financial Business Cycles. Review of Economic Dynamics, 18(1):140–164.
Jordà, Ò. (2014). Assessing the historical role of credit: Business cycles, financial crises and the
legacy of Charles S. Peirce. International Journal of Forecasting, 30(3):729–740.
Kiyotaki, N. and Moore, J. (1997). Credit Cycles. Journal of Political Economy, 105(2):211–48.
Koop, G., Pesaran, M. H., and Potter, S. M. (1996). Impulse response analysis in nonlinear
multivariate models. Journal of Econometrics, 74(1):119–147.
82
Conclusion
Krolzig, H.-M. (1997). Markov-Switching Vector Autoregressions, volume 454 of Lecture Notes
in Economics and Mathematical Systems. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin, Heidelberg.
Lindé, J., Smets, F., and Wouters, R. (2016). Challenges for Central Banks’ Macro Models.
CEPR Discussion Paper 11405, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
Pfeifer, J. (2013). A guide to specifying observation equations for the estimation of DSGE
models. Technical report, Working paper, University of Mannheim, Germany.
Svensson, L. E. O. (2014). Inflation Targeting and "Leaning against the Wind". International
Journal of Central Banking, 10(2):103–114.
Van den Heuvel, S. J. (2008). The welfare cost of bank capital requirements. Journal of Monetary
Economics, 55(2):298–320.
83
Chapter 2. Asymmetric Macro-Financial Spillovers
Appendix






























Note: The values report the mean value of the variables conditional on the state with the standard
deviation reported in brackets.




Discount factor patient households 0.9943
—
E
Discount factor impatient entrepreneurs 0.975
„ Elasticity of labour 1
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ySS Steady state mark up 1.2
– Capital share in production 0.25
”
k
Depreciation Rate of Capital 0.050
mcspread Marginal cost spread 0.0050
fi




Steady state Loan-To-Value ratio 0.35
◊ Bank capital adjustment cost 11
‹ Target capital-to-asset ratio 0.09
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Figure A.1: State Identification based on MS-VAR and DSGE model
Note: The blue, solid line represents the states identified by the MS-VAR, while the red dotted
line indicates the states identified by the non-linear, estimated DSGE model. The y-axis shows
the probability of being in a credit constrained state.
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Figure A.2: MS-VAR impulse response comparison real vs. simulated data
Note: The shaded regions report point-wise 68% credible sets. The coloured regions report the credible sets for
the real data, while the grey, transparent interval represents the credible set based on the model with simulated
data. The solid lines show the median response for the model with the real data, and the dashed lines report the
median for the simulated data.
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Figure A.3: LTV shock without bank balance sheet channel
Note: The blue line indicates a positive shock, while the red line represents a negative shock. The solid line is
the baseline model, while the dotted line is the model without a bank balance sheet channel. The parameters
and standard error are set to the posterior mean. The shock is induced for 5 periods, after which the series is left
to revert back to its steady state.
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Figure A.4: Net worth shock without bank balance sheet channel
Note: The blue line indicates a positive shock, while the red line represents a negative shock. The solid line is
the baseline model, while the dotted line is the model without a bank balance sheet channel. The parameters
and standard error are set to the posterior mean. The shock is induced for 5 periods, after which the series is left










Financial Stability and the Term
Premium
***
This chapter is jointly written with Julieta Yung.
3.1 Introduction
Many central banks have adopted new measures to target financial stability and mitigate e ects
of risk shocks on the real economy and financial markets. From the Brexit referendum to the
increase in uncertainty during the Financial Crisis, policy makers have been forced to respond
to a wide range of events that have increased perceived risk in financial markets, as well as the
macroeconomy as a whole. Risk and uncertainty are used interchangeably in this paper, as both
of these terms describe unexpected events that increase volatility in financial markets. However,
they are technically di erent. ‘Risk’ is defined as an event occurring with measurable probability,
while ‘uncertainty’ describes when the likelihood of future events is indefinite or incalculable
(Knight, 1921). However, measuring risk and its transmission through the financial system to
the real economy is challenging.
While there have been many empirical studies employing a wide array of indicators trying to
measure the e ects of risk shocks, empirical studies alone cannot be used to study the structural
role of these shocks and specific transmission mechanisms. For that purpose, Dynamic Stochastic
General Equilibrium (DSGE) models have been emerging that have slowly started to introduce
risk into standard New Keynesian models. Nevertheless, a caveat of these models is that they
often assume a specific form of the type of shock (i.e. a macroeconomic second-moment demand
shock) and say very little about the role on bank lending and financial stability. Instead, we
propose to measure the e ects of risk on the financial sector through the term premium. In this
paper, we will investigate the role of risk shocks on the macroeconomy, as well as the banking
sector and financial stability. We will investigate two policy questions: (i) does monetary policy
a ect risk premia? And if so, does accommodative monetary policy lead to a build-up of risk?
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And (ii) does macroprudential policy reduce financial instability in the economy?
We contribute to the literature in four ways. Firstly, we introduce a feedback mechanism
between the macroeconomy, the banking sector, and the term premium. By doing so, we
combine two strands of literature: the term structure literature, which has focussed on how the
macroeconomy a ects the term premium, and the uncertainty literature, which has primarily
looked at the e ects of risk on the macroeconomy. On top of being able to look at the e ects
of macroeconomic changes on the term premium and vice versa, the introduction of a banking
sector allows us to analyse how financial risk a ects bank lending and financial stability.
Secondly, our model is able to match basic macro and term premia moments observed in the
data. However, in contrast to previous studies which required a very high constant risk aversion
coe cient (CRRA), we achieve this with a remarkable low CRRA, which is more consistent with
macroeconomic studies (Havranek et al., 2015).
Thirdly, we do not have to make any specific assumptions about the type of risk in the model.
Risk, as expressed by the time-varying term premium, arises naturally in the model due to the
risk-averse preferences of households, which require higher compensation for long-term bonds
than short-term bonds. Any exogenous shock to the term premium can then be interpreted as a
truly unpredictable event. We can hence remain agnostic in our modelling approach of whether
the shock acts as a demand or supply shock. More so, it allows us to proxy di erent type of risk
shocks. As Andreasen (2012) points out rare disasters increase the level of the term premium,
while uncertainty (measured by stochastic volatility and GARCH) increases the variance of the
term premium.
Finally, our model allows us to investigate whether a) accommodative monetary leads to a
short-term reduction in risk premia but a long-term increase in financial instability, and b) the
e ectiveness of several macroprudential policies in mitigating and safeguarding the economy
from the negative consequences of financial risk.
In particular, we are interested in how risk a ects bank lending and investment. As a first
step, we look at the empirical responses of an exogenous shock to the term premium in a
Structural Vector Autoregressive (VAR) model using zero and sign restrictions. The empirical
exercise confirms that a shock to the term premium behaves very similarly to other risk shocks
identified in the literature (e.g. Bloom, 2009). We find that there is indeed a strong short-lived,
negative macroeconomic response with output decreasing and a less significant contraction
in private sector loans. After confirming that a term premium shock can be used to proxy
conventional risk shocks, we construct a DSGE model with heterogeneous banking (Gerali et al.,
2010; Gambacorta and Signoretti, 2014) and extend it with a government sector, asset pricing,
time-varying risk premia and Epstein-Zin preferences similar to Rudebusch and Swanson (2012).
We calibrate it to the US economy and solve it using third-order approximations. We find that
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the term premium shock has large, temporary, negative e ects on the macroeconomy and a ects
the lending behaviour of banks by reducing the volume of loans and investment. We can confirm
that expansionary monetary policy would indeed lead to a reduction in the risk premium, and
an increase in financial instability as stated in Adrian and Liang (2016). Also, we conclude that
macroprudential policies targeting the loan-to-value ratio of borrowers can be very e ective in
mitigating some of the negative consequences of risk shocks on the economy. without having any
of the negative e ects of increasing the capital/asset ratio
Our papers relates to two strands of literature: a) the macro-finance literature in term
structure models, and b) the macro literature on risk shocks. The literature on macro-finance
term structure models is still evolving. While early studies were mostly limited to endowment
economies, there has been a slow surge of models integrating the term structure into non-linear
DSGE models. Earlier literature has shown that term premia can vary significantly over time
(Piazzesi and Schneider, 2007). Our paper relates to the term premium literature which also
uses third-order approximations to generate a time-varying risk premium and uses Epstein-Zin
preferences to match finance moments (Rudebusch and Swanson, 2012; Rudebusch et al., 2007;
Van Binsbergen et al., 2012; Caldara et al., 2012). However, in addition to these papers, we
introduce a banking sector to be able to measure the e ects of risk on lending and investment,
and importantly, build in a feedback loop so that changes to the term premium have e ects on
the macroeconomy. Another advantage of our approach is that we also account for the reverse
causality from the term premium to the macroeconomy. Favero et al. (2005) and Hamilton
and Kim (2002) find indeed some reduced from evidence that the term premium is not just
influenced by macro factors, but can also influence the real economy in itself. As suggested by
New Keynesian models and empirical evidence in Rudebusch et al. (2007), a decrease in the term
premium should cause an increase in output growth, which would render the term premium
counter-cyclical.
The term premium shock has a large scope of interpretation, as it a ects long-term risk
expectations of households. As such, it is related to several strands of macroeconomic literature:
a) ‘Animal spirit’ shocks (e.g. Azariadis, 1981; Grauwe, 2011) that a ect the expectations of
investors and skew it toward being optimistic or pessimistic, and b) Uncertainty shocks (e.g.
Bloom, 2009; Christiano et al., 2014) which model uncertainty shock as a second moment shock
to Total Factor Productivity (TFP). The advantage of our model is that we do not need to
make any specific assumption about whether the risk shock is behaving like a demand or supply
shock (i.e. uncertainty shock). By using the term premium and solving it using a third-order
approximation, we explicitly allow there to be a constant level of baseline risk, as the steady
state level of the risk premium is positive even in the absence of shocks. We also do not need to
make any assumption about specific agents’ beliefs, as is necessary to incorporate an animal
91
Chapter 3. Financial Stability and the Term Premium
spirit shock into a DSGE model. Modelling a term premium shock allows for a straight-forward
way to test for the e ects of shocks to long-term risk perceptions in a relatively standard DSGE
framework.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 3.2 provides intuition on what movements in
the term premium represent as it captures investors’ perception of long-term risk. Section 3.3
provides an empirical framework to study the impact of a risk shock on macroeconomic variables
using a Bayesian vector autoregressive approach. Section 3.4 describes the main assumptions
and mechanisms behind the DSGE model that links the real economy and the financial sector
via the term premium. We also provide details about the calibration and solution methods.
Section 3.5 presents the model-implied macroeconomic implications of a risk shock along with
the term premium’s response to classic macroeconomic shocks. We also study the e ects of
monetary policy shocks as they relate to the term premium and financial stability. Section 3.5.2
explores the impact of macroprudential policies on mitigating the e ects of risk shocks. Finally,
Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 The Term Premium as a Measure of Risk
The term premium, or bond risk premium, is the compensation that investors require in order to
hold a long-term bond instead of a series of short-term bonds during the same horizon. As such,
a high term premium reflects a perceived increase in financial risk over the life of a bond. This
compensation for risk varies throughout time as investors update their beliefs about the future
path of the economy, including changes in expected inflation, the course of monetary policy, and
their tolerance for risk, among other factors.1
The evolution of the ten-year term premium from 1961 to 2017 is shown in Figure 3.1 along
with the ten-year U.S. Treasury yield. In December 2013, for example, a ten-year U.S. Treasury
bond earned a 2.90 percent annualised yield. More than half of this return, 1.73 percentage
points, reflected the compensation risk-neutral investors at that time would require in order to
be exposed to long-term risk, i.e. the term premium. As can be observed from the figure, the
term premium is substantial –around 1.63% for the past six decades– and varies significantly
1The term premium is not the same as the term spread. The term spread is the di erence between long- and
short-term bonds, also known as the slope of the yield curve, and can be decomposed into two components: the
expectations term and the term premium component. It is well established in the literature that the term spread
is a leading indicator for recessions, from Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991) and Estrella and Mishkin (1998) to
Ang et al. (2006) and Liu and Moench (2016). The intuition behind the predictive power of the term spread is
that, since the expectation hypothesis poses that long-term rates are determined by future expected short-term
rates, an increase in the expectations term implies that future monetary policy is likely to tighten, anticipating a
recession in the future. Whereas the term spread also incorporates variation in short-term expectations, the term
premium is primarily governed by expectations of long-term risk to the economic outlook.
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over time –ranging from -0.65% to 4.79%. Moreover, it has been around zero for the past two
years.














Sources: Federal Reserve Bank of New York; Federal Reserve Board.
At least part of the decline in the ten-year yield since the early 1980’s can be attributed
to a lower term premium. However, in reality, the term premium is unobservable and as such,
needs to be estimated or inferred from the term structure of interest rates and its expected path.
Several techniques have been proposed to proxy for investors’ expectations of future economic
conditions, often yielding di ering patterns, for which it is important to provide further intuition
of what movements in the term premium represent.2
From a traditional finance perspective, the term premium is driven by uncertainty about
future short-term rates. Forward-looking agents, however, expect the future path of policy rates
to be shaped by macroeconomic forces (e.g., inflation, labor market conditions, growth, etc.), as
policy-making is contingent on the state of the economy. Therefore, a macro-finance approach
to understanding the term premium implies that macroeconomic uncertainty is the underlying
driver of expectations about the path of short-term rates, and hence should be embedded in the
term premium.
To provide economic intuition of what movements in the term premium represent, we compare
2Swanson (2007), Rudebusch et al. (2007), and Li et al. (2017) compare di erent estimates of the term
premium and provide excellent overviews of the challenges faced when measuring the long-term expectation of
short rates. Li et al. (2017) conclude that the most important factor in accounting for di erences across estimates
is whether the chosen methodology employs surveys of market participants or not. For this paper, we utilise the
ACM term premium measure developed by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. For a short summary of the
methodology and an overview of how it compares to other measures, refer to Adrian et al. (2014).
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its evolution to several economic variables, including di erent measures of uncertainty. Figure
3.2(a) displays the term premium along with the unemployment rate. As it has been established
in the literature, the term premium is counter-cyclical –rising along with unemployment during
economic downturns and falling during economic upswings. This counter-cyclicality suggests
that the term premium should be negatively correlated with output and consumption; therefore,
as household’s marginal utility of consumption is high, the term premium should rise. In fact,
the correlation between the term premium and year-over-year changes in personal consumption
expenditures is –44%.3 This interpretation is also consistent with the empirical evidence in
Ludvigson and Ng (2009), indicating that agents seek compensation for macroeconomic risks
associated with recessions that account for variation in the term premium.
We use the Merrill Lynch MOVE Index, which summarises options-implied expected volatility
of Treasury yields, in order to capture investors’ uncertainty about future interest rates in Figure
3.2(b). During the overlapping period, the correlation between these two series is 50 percent.4
Finally, as can be observed in Figures 3.2(c) and 3.2(d), the term premium is associated with
fluctuations in economic policy (57% correlation) and inflation uncertainty (48% correlation), as
measured by di erent components from the Baker et al. (2016) Uncertainty Index. Baker et al.
(2016) estimate the dispersion among economic forecasters in the consumer price index (CPI) as
a measure of inflation uncertainty, and also in the purchase of goods and services by state, local
and the federal government.5
We therefore expect the term premium to be high when investors are more risk averse; the
marginal rate of consumption is high; output is low; or there is more uncertainty about the
future economic outlook (i.e. the path of interest rates, inflation, monetary policy).6 In the next
3Monthly estimates of market-based Personal Consumption Expenditures are available from 1988/01 to
2017/04 from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. The term premium is also negatively correlated with monthly
Industrial Production year-over-year changes from the Federal Reserve Board during the 1962/02–2017/04 period
(-32%) and quarterly GDP year-over-year changes from the Bureau of Economic Analysis from 1962-Q3 to
2017-Q1 (-32%).
4Adrian et al. (2014) also show that the term premium is correlated with the disagreement about the level
of the federal funds rate four quarters ahead (as measured by the average forecast of the highest ten responses
minus that of the lowest ten responses in the Blue Chip Financial Forecasts survey) from 1982 to 2013. The
correlation between the term premium and the quarterly dispersion of professional forecasters 3-month T-bill
rate estimates four quarters ahead is 53% during the 1981–2017 period.
5The term premium is also correlated with the Jurado et al. (2015) monthly (one-year ahead )macroeconomic
uncertainty index (46%) and the quarterly dispersion of professional forecasters CPI estimates over the next ten
years (64%). Moreover, Mallick et al. (2017) developed a structural vector autoregressive model and find that a
quarterly VIX shock is followed by a higher U.S. term premium between quarters 5 and 10 and that a quarterly
shock to implied bond volatility has a statistically significant positive (although short-lived) impact on the term
premium.
6There are, of course, other explanations for movements in the term premium, such as the recent central bank
purchases of bonds under Quantitative Easing, the use of explicit forward-rate guidance to reduce uncertainty
about the future path of monetary policy, and the possible flight-to-quality flows that reflect preference for certain
class of assets.
94
The Impact of a Risk Shock: Empirical Approach
sections, we further explore the e ects of risk shocks on the economy via the term premium,
both empirically and in the context of a DSGE model.
Figure 3.2: Term Premium and Uncertainty
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Notes: Term premium is the ACM series from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, as in Adrian
et al. (2013), from January 1961 to March 2017. Unemployment rate is from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics, and shaded areas indicate NBER recession periods. Interest Rate Uncertainty is proxied
by the Merrill lynch Option Volatility Estimate (MOVE) Index. Economic Policy and Inflation
Uncertainty are obtained from the Baker et al. (2016) Uncertainty Index. All data are monthly. Refer
to Appendix 3.A.1 for details.
3.3 The Impact of a Risk Shock: Empirical Approach
As a first step, we want to understand the role of the term premium on both the macroeconomy
and financial variables in an empirical Vector Autoregressive (VAR) model. This allows us to
obtain a benchmark from which we can evaluate the theoretical DSGE responses in the later
section. Also, it provides us with an initial idea of the quantitative e ects and persistence of a
term premium or risk shock. The structural Bayesian VAR(12) follows
A0xt = A1xt≠1 + et (3.1)
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where A0 and A1 are the matrices of structural coe cients, and et is an orthogonal vector of
structural innovations. The vector xt≠1 also includes a constant. We use monthly U.S. data
from 1961 until 2017 for output, inflation, the shadow federal funds rate, bank loans to the
private sector, and the term premium (see Appendix 3.A.2 for a detailed description of the
data). We choose the shadow federal funds rate to account for monetary policy during the zero
lower bound period constraining the policy rate from below. Output and bank loans enter the
model in log growth rates, while the remaining variables are in levels. We choose an independent
Normal-Wishart prior and a lag length of 12 months.
3.3.1 Identification
We follow Canova and Nicolo (2002) and employ sign restrictions ex post on the impulse responses
to structurally identify a term premium shock in the data. The advantage of the term premium
shock is that it can be interpreted as any type of unanticipated movement capturing a change in
investors’ perception of long-term financial risk or uncertainty. There is a multitude of potential
real life occurrences of such shocks (e.g. political events, new regulation, trade agreements), so
that understanding the e ect of a term premium shock on the economy has important policy
implications that we want to later interpret in the context of our model.
As the data frequency is monthly, sign restrictions allow us to account for the fact that a
term premium or risk shock a ects other financial variables simultaneously. A shock that raises
the term premium (tp
t
) implies that long-term risk in financial markets is increasing and that
financial uncertainty is worsening. The contemporaneous sign restrictions are reported in Table
3.1. We restrict financial risk to be negatively correlated with output growth (y
t
), consistent with
the counter-cyclical properties of the term premium shown in the previous section.7 Another
key identification assumption is that monetary policy mainly influences the short-term rate (i
t
),
so that the term premium has no contemporaneous e ect on the short term interest rate. To
impose a combination of zero and sign restrictions, we use the algorithm of Binning (2013).
While we are only interested in a risk shock per se, we need to ensure that the shock is fully
identified and cannot be mis-specified as another shock in the model. We explicitly identify a
demand, supply, monetary policy, and a credit shock in the data to avoid mistaking the financial
risk shock with other shocks in the model. We use standard sign restrictions on output and
inflation (fi
t
): a demand shock increases output and inflation simultaneously, while a supply
7Rudebusch et al. (2007) show that in response to a monetary policy or a technology shock, a rise in the term
premium is associated with current and future weakness in output and that a decline in the term premium is
associated with stimulus to the economy. However, for a government spending shock, a rise in the term premium
is associated with current and future output strength, thus finding that the correlation between output and the
term premium depends on the nature of the shock itself.
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Table 3.1: Sign Restrictions
Variable/Shock Demand Supply Monetary Policy Credit Financial Risk
y
t
> 0 < 0 < 0 0 < 0
fi
t
> 0 > 0 < 0 0
i
t







shock increases inflation, but decreases output (Kilian and Lütkepohl, 2017). As inflation rises in
both cases, so does the interest rate. A contractionary monetary policy shock (hence an increase
in the interest rate), leads to a decline in both output and inflation. Finally, a credit shock, being
a pure financial shock, increases the volume of loans (b
t
) but has no e ect on macroeconomic
variables contemporaneously. This set of identification restrictions is thus necessary and su cient
to ensure we identify a shock to the term premium. To remain as agnostic as possible, we impose
these restrictions only contemporaneously upon impact of the shock.
3.3.2 Results
Figure 3.3 shows the impulse responses of a one standard deviation positive shock to the term
premium. From the left column, we can see that a shock to the term premium of 2,000 basis
points has a short-lived, yet very sizeable e ect on the economy. Output declines by 2% and
returns back to the steady state after five years. This confirms that the term premium is indeed
counter-cyclical as shown in Section 3.2. The response of inflation and the interest rate is not
very strong and zero is included in the credible set. Loans decline and exhibit more persistent
e ects than output, with the median response only returning to the steady state after roughly 10
years. To confirm that the term premium is indeed capturing financial uncertainty, we perform
the same analysis but use the junk-bond spread instead of the term premium to capture financial
risk (see Appendix 3.A.2 for a description of the data). A widening of the junk-bond spread, an
indicator of the overall creditworthiness of the private sector, is often a signal of higher perceived
risk in the financial markets. If the term premium is a good measure of financial uncertainty,
we should expect a similar behaviour of macroeconomic responses for a shock to the junk-bond
spread, as we observe for the term premium shock. We linearly detrend the junk-bond spread
and use the same BVAR structure and identification restrictions. The right column of Figure
3.3 reports the results for a one-standard deviation shock to the junk-bond spread. Similarly to
the term premium shock, output and loans decline significantly. Also, inflation increases, yet
insignificantly, while interest rate decreases persistently. In contrast to the term premium shock,
97
Chapter 3. Financial Stability and the Term Premium
the e ects of a junk-bond spread shock seem to be quantitatively larger. A possible explanation
for this di erence is that the junk-bond spread relates more closely to corporate short-term risk
and is thus more volatile. Importantly, we find that banks reduce loans to the private sector as a
consequence of a risk shock and thus established empirically that there is indeed a link between
risk and loan allocation that renders further investigation.
Figure 3.3: Impulse Responses to a Term Premium (left) and Junk-Bond Spread (right) Shocks
Notes: The shaded regions report point-wise 68% Monte Carlo credible sets. The solid line shows the
median response to a one standard deviation shock to the term premium (left column) and junk-bond
spread (right column).
To check the robustness of the results, we estimate alternative specifications. Figure 3.B.1
in the Appendix reports the results for a one-standard deviation shock to the term premium
excluding the financial crisis (left column) and focussing only on the period of the Great
Moderation (right column). Excluding the financial crisis (January 1961–July 2007) has no
e ect on either the quantitative nor qualitative results. Looking only at the time of the Great
Moderation (January 1986–July 2007) does not change the results qualitatively, but increases
the credible sets around the median response due to the decrease in data volume. As a further
robustness check to show that our model is well specified, we report the responses of a monetary
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policy shock in Figure 3.B.2 in the Appendix. In line with economic theory, a contractionary
monetary policy shock causes output and inflation to fall on impact, and the term premium
to increase –only slowly converging back to zero. Finally, we report the responses to a VIX
shock in Figure 3.B.3 in order to investigate the e ects of short-term risk rather than long-term
risk. As the CBOE VXO/VIX is only available from July 1986, the credible sets are wider than
for the term premium model due to the reduced sample size. The responses are qualitatively
similar. However, the responses for the VIX shock are less persistent than for a term premium
shock. The reduction in the persistence of the macroeconomic responses is consistent with the
assumption that short-term risk, as captured by the VIX, would have less persistent e ects than
changes in long-term risk, as measured by the term premium.
Next, we develop a structural model to further analyse the relationship between the term
premium and the macroeconomy.
3.4 DSGE Model
In this section, we construct a New-Keynesian DSGE model that can generate a positive and
time-varying term premium to structurally analyse the e ects of a long-term risk shock on the
macroeconomy, the banking sector, and financial stability.8 There are two key features that
help match term premium moments: Epstein-Zin preferences and third-order solution methods.
Firstly, Epstein and Zin (1989) preferences have the advantage that risk aversion can be modelled
independently from the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES). Intuitively, Epstein-Zin
preferences imply that households are not just concerned with smoothing their consumption once
sudden shocks are realised in the short term, but also with medium- and longer-term changes
in consumption, allowing long-term risk to play a role in households’ decision-making process.
As Epstein-Zin preferences yield the same results using first-order approximations as standard
utility functions, the model is still able to match macroeconomic moments. However, by allowing
an additional parameter, –
EZ
, the risk aversion of households can now be amplified to match
the empirical features of bond moments, as well.
Secondly, using higher order solution methods generates heteroskedasticity in the stochastic
discount factor, which creates an endogenously determined time-varying term premium. First-
order solutions would imply that the expectation hypothesis holds and hence for the term
premium to be zero. Second-order solutions can improve upon this by generating a positive,
yet constant term premium. Only by using third-order solutions, we manage to capture a
8The advantage of the New Keynesian model over a Real Business Cycle model is that inflation and inflation
expectations are taken into account which is crucial for the determination of the yield curve and thus, the term
premium.
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time-varying term premium and match empirical bond moments.
In this setup, asset prices become relevant for real behaviour, giving the term premium a key
role as a feedback mechanism between financial markets and the macroeconomy. Importantly,
this framework allows us to structurally study the implications of a term premium shock for
financial stability in a general equilibrium context and thus understand the mechanisms by which
long-term risk a ects the macroeconomy.
3.4.1 Model Description
As in Gerali et al. (2010) and Gambacorta and Signoretti (2014), the model contains several
agents: patient households, impatient entrepreneurs, retailers, wholesale and retail banks, capital
goods producers, and a monetary policy authority. We modify their baseline model by introducing
non-defaultable long-term bonds that are issued by a fiscal authority to finance government
spending. Long-term bonds are determined by standard asset pricing rules that allow for a
time-varying term premium to arise endogenously in the model and create a feedback loop
between the financial sector and the real economy.
Households are patient and provide labor to impatient entrepreneurs. Competitive
entrepreneurs produce intermediate goods which are sold to retailers. These retailers di erentiate
the intermediate goods and sell them with a mark-up to households, who also own the retailers
and keep their profits. Banks have two branches: a wholesale and a retail branch. Wholesale
banks take deposits from households and can invest in long-term bonds. They operate under
perfect competition. Retail banks are monopolistic and give out loans to entrepreneurs charging
a mark-up fee. In addition, they take and monitor collateral from the entrepreneurs given a
stochastic loan-to-value (LTV) ratio. To sum up, banks can choose between a) keeping deposits
which are equivalent to short-term T-Bills, as they pay the risk-free rate, b) give out loans
to entrepreneurs and receive profits from the mark-up they charge, or c) invest in long-term
bonds which pay a term premium. The remaining profits are invested in bank capital which is
monitored by the central bank or monetary policy authority. The monetary policy authority
sets the policy rate, determines the capital/asset ratio for banks, and the LTV target ratio for
entrepreneurs. The fiscal authority issues long-term government bonds to finance government
spending which is modelled exogenously. In addition, there are capital producers who buy
undepreciated capital from entrepreneurs and re-sell it for a new price back to entrepreneurs
taking into account quadratic adjustment cost. This is necessary to derive a price for capital.
Similar to Rudebusch and Swanson (2012), we focus on long-term bonds rather than equity, in
order to capture changes in households’ perception of long-term risk. Since long-term bonds
a ect real behaviour and vice versa, the term premium has important policy implications for
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the central bank, which we further investigate in Section 3.5.2.
Households






















is labour supply, —
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is the patient discount factor, and –
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1/„ is the Frisch elasticity of labour and 1/Ï is the IES. Households deposit savings at wholesale
banks, for which they receive a risk-free return. They also own retail firms, which are monopolistic
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where d
t
are bank deposits, w
t
is the real wage, and rib
t
is the short-term rate set by the monetary
policy authority. The central bank has therefore the potential to directly impact the household
decision-making process, since an increase in the policy rate would induce households to increase
their savings. JR
t

















Households also provide labour to the entrepreneurs for the production of intermediate goods,










Entrepreneurs need to borrow from banks by providing capital as a collateral, but also produce
goods, employ households and consume. They form the link between the real economy and the
banking sector and are thus important for generating a feedback loop between the financial and
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relative competitive price of the intermediate good produced by the entrepreneur, and ”
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. A high LTV ratio implies that banks can lend more for the same amount of
collateral and vice versa. The borrowing constraint determines how much entrepreneurs can




ensures that the borrowing constraint is
binding and credit is constrained in the economy.
Entrepreneurs do not work but use capital and labour in the production of intermediate
goods. As in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), capital has many functions in this model and thus
establishes another important feedback mechanism between the real economy and the financial
sector. Capital is used (i) in the production of intermediate goods, (ii) as a collateral for
the entrepreneurs, and (iii) as a source of funds for investment. The production function for















is stochastic and follows an AR(1)




. Entrepreneurs operate under perfect
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This is similar to the households’ Euler equation but di ers by the Lagrange multiplier on
the borrowing constraint, ⁄E
t
, which represents the marginal value of one unit of additional
borrowing. Another di erence is that entrepreneurs, unlike households, discount at a higher rate
and face the higher bank loan rate, rb
t
, rather than the risk-free rate, rib
t












The investment Euler equation equalises the marginal benefit with the marginal cost of saving
capital. As capital serves as collateral, the equation also depends on the Lagrange multiplier of














































The banking sector is divided into a perfectly competitive wholesale and a monopolistic retail
sector. The wholesale sector maximises bank profits by optimising the net interest margin
between the loan rate, the long-term bond rate, and the deposit rate subject to the quadratic
adjustment costs of deviating from a target capital/asset ratio, ‹. As the deposit rate is the
same as the risk-free rate, banks’ demand for deposits is elastic and the amount of deposits is










































represents the total assets of the bank. Kb
t
is the banks’ capital and ◊ is the
parameter for the capital adjustment costs. Monetary policy tightening, i.e. a higher policy rate,
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thus lowers bank profits, as households increase their deposits. If lower profits lead banks to







, which puts upward pressure on the price of
long-term bonds, then real long-term yields would decline. This price pressure is independent
from the expectations of short-term rates in the future; i.e. it’s purely a term premium e ect.
This mechanism implies that monetary policy would then have indirect e ects on the long-term
yield by lowering the term premium through this portfolio-rebalancing channel.
Wholesale banks are subject to a balance sheet constraint that can also be interpreted as a
capital adequacy constraint. Loans and bonds have to be backed up by su cient bank capital


















While the long-term bond rate is determined by the households’ stochastic discount factor, the
retail bank on the other hand, repackages the wholesale loans and charges a mark-up, µ
b
, on the









The retail banks have market power, which helps them to adjust their lending in response
to shocks or cycles. Notice that, everything else held constant, a term premium shock that
increases the long-term rate, also increases the loan rate charged by retail banks, making access
to credit more expensive for entrepreneurs. Alternatively, in response to a monetary policy
shock that raises the policy rate, the bank can increase its mark-up on the loan rate, a ecting
the entrepreneurs’ ability to finance new projects. Thus both, the term premium and monetary
policy shocks, have the potential to indirectly a ect the real economy through this credit-access
channel. Another crucial determinant for the feedback loop between the banking sector and the
real economy is bank capital. Bank capital depreciates at rate ”
b
and accrues from past capital







t≠1(1 ≠ ”b) + JBt≠1. (3.18)
Since it is pro-cyclical, bank capital worsens when output declines due to decreasing banks’
profits. The latter is defined as the sum of both the retail and wholesale sector profits on loans,
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Retailers and Capital Good Producers
The monopolistic retailers di erentiate the intermediate goods produced by the entrepreneurs at
no cost and sell them with a mark-up, x
t
. However, retailers face quadratic price adjustment
cost, which causes prices to be sticky. The parameter Ÿ
P
represents the degree of price stickiness.






















































t≠1), and Yt is total output. The firm’s
mark-up, mky
t
, is stochastic and follows an AR(1) process with the autocorrelation coe cient
fl
mk
and an i.i.d. mark-up shock, Ámk
t
, with variance ‡
mk
.
Capital good producers are perfectly competitive and their main task is to transform the old,
undepreciated capital from entrepreneurs to new capital without any additional costs. They then
resell the new capital to the entrepreneurs in the next period at price P k
t
, so that the relative







. In addition, capital producers ‘invest’ in the final goods bought from
retailers, which are not consumed by households, and also transform these into new capital.
The final goods to capital transformation is subject to quadratic adjustment costs that are
parameterised by Ÿ
i
, the investment (I
t
) adjustment cost parameter. The first-order condition
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Monetary Policy
Monetary policy follows a standard Taylor rule, so that the policy rate is set according to
1 + rib
t
































are the interest rate, inflation




are the inflation and output monetary policy
parameters. Ár
t
is an i.i.d monetary policy shock with variance ‡
r
.9
The monetary policy authority is also responsible for setting a target capital/asset ratio for
banks to avoid an over-leveraging of the economy similar to the Basel Tier 1 leverage ratios.
Moreover, the central bank also sets the LTV target ratio for entrepreneurs. These two choices,
nevertheless, are independent from the monetary policy rule that targets output and price





, the price of a bond at time t maturing at t + n, be determined by the risk-adjusted












= 1 and m







) . The yield
for the n-th period zero-coupon bond, i(n)
t









9Fuerst and Mau (2016) point out that the exact monetary policy rule specification is important to generate
variability in the term premium in response to macroeconomic shocks. In order to achieve greater variability in
the term premium, the monetary authority should respond to the level of output relative to the steady state
rather than the output gap (see Rudebusch and Swanson, 2012). As an output level rule means the central bank
is committing to a contractionary policy for longer, thus reducing inflation by more, the term premium is more
a ected than in the case of an output gap rule.
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Without loss of generality, we assume that long-term bonds are default-free securities issued by
the fiscal authority that pay a geometrically declining coupon every period in perpetuity.10 The
price of the long-term bond in this economy, Âpl
t

















is the coupon decay rate that controls the duration of the bond. We set the decay
rate to match the 10-year maturity benchmark rate for zero-coupon bonds.11 In order to
analyse the e ects of an unexpected increase in long-term risk, we introduce a term premium
shock, µtp
t








t≠1 + Átpt , for Átpt ≥ N (0, ‡tp).12 Notice that a positive term premium shock lowers the
price of the long-term bond and therefore increases the yield that investors require in order to
be compensated for the higher risk. This exogenous variation in long-term bonds a ects the
economy like a shock to long-term uncertainty/risk, as it implies a decrease in the long-term bond
price that is not reflected in the risk-neutral bond price, so that it must be related to an increase
in the compensation that banks require to hold long-term debt due to risk. In practice, various
exogenous events could cause an unexpected increase in long-term risk perceptions (e.g. political
elections/referendums, new regulation, discovery of additional resources). As Andreasen (2012)
points out rare disasters increase the level of the term premium, while uncertainty increases the
variance of the term premium, so that our term premium shock can account for both types of
events.
From a purely financial decomposition, the price of the bond can be expressed as the
risk-neutral present value of the bond, plus the covariance between future payo s and











































. This implies that the term premium depends
on the covariance between future returns and consumption growth, and the covariance between
future returns and the utility index of households; i.e. their future prospects. Hence investors
10This is equivalent to assuming that long-term bonds are infinitely-lived consol-style bonds as in Chin et al.
(2015). The purpose of this assumption is to reduce the pricing relationship to just one recursive equation in the
model, rather than having to solve for each maturity level. As shown in Rudebusch and Swanson (2012) this
simplification still generates equivalent results to using ten-year zero-coupon bonds, while significantly reducing
the computational burden.
11We use an adjusted formula of Macaulay duration D = (1+i)(1+i≠”c) and solve it for ”c with D = 40 periods to
mimic a ten-year zero-coupon bond for which duration is equal to maturity. Note that ”c < —≠1 is the upper
bound that defines an infinite duration bond.
12We model the term premium shock as an AR(1) process following the empirical evidence supporting the idea
that investors’ perceived declines in the term premium are persistent (see Adrian et al., 2013). Moreover, this is
consistent with the literature on uncertainty or credit risk shocks being persistent, as in Christiano et al. (2014).
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demand a higher term premium when marginal utility of consumption is high and their future
prospects have deteriorated, their relative risk aversion increases (–
EZ
ø), they become less
patient (—
P
¿), or their ability to smooth consumption across periods diminishes (Ï ø).















≠ 1 . (3.27)
An important assumption for a positive term premium is that risk neutrality does not hold,
as otherwise m
t+1 would be equal to the expected future short-term interest rate with the
expectations hypothesis holding. Assuming that households are however risk averse, the di erence
between the long-term rate and the sum of expected future short-term rates is characterised by a
time-varying term premium. As guaranteed by the absence of arbitrage in the bond markets, we
compute the term premium as the di erence between the yield on the long-term bond and the
yield on the equivalent risk-neutral bond, which can simply be defined as the expected present
value of future payo s discounted at the risk-free rate rather than the household’s stochastic











Hence the implied term premium, Âl
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≠ 1 . (3.29)
Government Sector
For simplicity, we assume that all government spending, G
t
, is financed exclusively via long-term
bonds. The budget constraint of the fiscal authority is thus expressed as the ratio of the value


























Government spending follows a stationary AR(1) process
G
t








where Gss is the steady state value of government consumption, fl
g
captures the degree of
correlation in fiscal policy, and Ág
t
is a government spending i.i.d. shock with variance ‡
g
.
Market Clearing and Aggregation










as it is a closed economy.
3.4.2 Solution and Calibration
Since the dimension of the model is relatively high with 14 state variables, our only feasible
option to solve the model is through perturbation methods. As the term premium needs to be
time-varying, we use third-order solutions to ensure realistic dynamics for the term premium.13
We apply pruning to cut out unstable higher-order explosive terms. The advantage of using
third-order solutions is that the macroeconomic responses remain mostly unchanged, and thus
correspond to results in the previous literature, while the responses for the bond markets can
be rendered more realistically. As estimation of larger-scale, non-linear models is still di cult,
we follow Rudebusch and Swanson (2012) and calibrate our model to fit specific moments for
both macroeconomic, as well as financial variables. Table 3.2 reports the values of the calibrated
parameters for the baseline model.
Most of these values are standard and based on previous estimates for the U.S. data. For the
households, the discount factors are set such that —
P





ensures that entrepreneurs are more impatient. „ is based on the inverse of the Frisch
elasticity being 2/3. Ï is based on the IES being 2/3, in line with previous micro-founded studies
which find the IES to be smaller than one (e.g. Vissing-Jørgensen, 2002). We set the Epstein-Zin
parameter –
EZ
= ≠6 to match the term premium moments. Using the constant relative risk
aversion (CRRA) formula in Swanson (2010), this number implies an overall CRRA of 2. This
13Caldara et al. (2012) show that perturbation methods provide equally accurate solutions to models with
recursive preferences than Chebychev polynomials and value function iterations, but are considerably faster.
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Table 3.2: Calibrated Parameters
































































is a remarkable low result in the macro-finance literature, in which estimates unrealistically
range from 30 to 110 (e.g. Rudebusch and Swanson, 2012), while at the same time being very
consistent with the low estimates found in the macro literature (see Havranek et al., 2015 for a
meta-study).
The production parameters are standard. The price elasticity of demand is assumed to be 6,
which implies mkySS = 1.2 . The adjustment cost for prices, modelled via Rotemberg pricing,
follows the estimated values by Gerali et al. (2010), as do the adjustment cost for investment, Ÿ
i
,
and the adjustment cost for banks, ◊. The capital share is assumed to be 0.3, and the rate of
depreciation follows an annual depreciation rate of 20%. The banking parameter, ‹, is set to
match the Basel capital/asset target ratio of 0.09. The decay rate for consol bonds, ”
c
, is set to
match the 10-year bond duration. The monetary policy rule parameters reflect that the central
bank targets inflation and output, but inflation more heavily. The shock parameters are set to
standard values, with the persistence of shocks being 0.9, except for the mark-up shock, which is
less persistent. The standard deviations of the shocks are set between 0.2–1 percentage points,
depending on the volatility of the respective variable. Finally, the steady state capital/output
and government spending/output ratios are set as in Rudebusch and Swanson (2012).
To evaluate the fit of the model, we compare both macroeconomic as well as asset price
moments implied by the DSGE model to the data. We use quarterly U.S. data for chained
GDP, consumption, investment, and labour. The Hedrick-Prescott filter is used to compute
the business cycle component of the log of these macroeconomic variables. For inflation, the
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Table 3.3: Comparing Simulated Model Data with Actual Data
Unconditional U.S. Data, 1961-2016 Model Data
Moments (1961-2007)
SD[Y ] 1.46 (1.46) 1.40
SD[C] 0.85 (0.83) 1.00
SD[I] 4.08 (3.95) 1.19
SD[l] 2.10 (1.97) 1.62
SD[fi] 2.45 (2.52) 2.66
SD[rib] 3.20 (2.70) 0.71
µ[Âl] 1.62 (1.74) 1.63
SD[Âl] 1.19 (1.20) 1.05
Notes: All variables are reported in quarterly percentage points except for inflation, the interest rate,
and the term premium which are converted into annual frequency. For robustness, we compute the
unconditional moments for both data from 1961-2016 and data excluding the financial crisis from
1961-2007 in parentheses. The model moments are computed by simulating the data 224 times to be
consistent with the duration of the actual data.
interest rate, and the term premium, annualised data are used. The interest rate is the shadow
Federal Funds rate, and inflation is calculated using the GDP deflator. The term premium is the
ten-year Treasury average term premium from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (Adrian
et al., 2013). Details can be found in the Data Appendix 3.A.3.
Since we use third-order approximations, theoretical moments are more complicated to
compute, so that we use simulated moments instead. Table 3.3 shows the results for the baseline
calibration. As we can see, the model performs well in matching output, consumption, labour,
inflation, and in particular the term premium moments. Unlike previous studies, we are able to
match the term premium moments with a very small CRRA of 2, which is more consistent with
the macroeconomic literature. It performs less well in matching investment and the interest
rate. In both of these cases, the model indicates lower volatility than is found in the data. The
volatility of investment is potentially lower, as government spending in our model does not crowd
out private investment, so that there is less variability in the model simulated variables than in
the data.
After performing some sensitivity analysis, we conclude that in particular, the parameters for
the IES, the capital share, the monetary policy parameters, the Epstein-Zin parameter, and the
variance for the term premium shock are important to determine the term premium moments.
There is a tradeo  in increasing the volatility of the interest rate versus increasing the mean
of the term premium, as higher interest rate volatility corresponds to an increase in the term
premium. Interestingly, changing the banking or production parameters has very little e ect
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on the term premium. Instead, it seems that the term premium moments are mostly driven by
household parameters. The dynamics of the model are, however, relatively robust to changes in
the parameters, as seen in Figure 3.C.1 in Appendix 3.C.
3.5 Results
We begin by analysing how a term premium shock a ects the macroeconomy. As in the empirical
section, we interpret a term premium shock as a temporary, exogenous change in long-term
risk that is immediately priced in the financial markets. Figure 3.4 reports the results. A 10
basis-point term premium shock that raises the long-term interest rate has a clear negative e ect
on the macroeconomy, with output, consumption, investment, and inflation all falling upon
impact. These results are consistent with the idea that an increase in the long-term rate that is
orthogonal to the expected path of future short-term rates, reflects higher perceived risk in the
economy, inducing households to save more and consume less, prices to go down, and output
and investment to contract. While the e ect on consumption and investment is more persistent,
the e ect on output and inflation dissipates quickly, as the monetary policy authority responds
with monetary accommodation (lowering the policy rate) to stimulate the economy. The policy
rate therefore declines, as the monetary policy rule prescribes lower interest rates in response to
a decline in output and inflation. Both consumption and inflation show an initial overshooting
but then converge back to their steady states.
To understand the e ect of a term premium shock on the financial sector, we look at the
response of the loan/deposit ratio, and find that the financial system becomes more leveraged
and hence less stable as risk increases.14 The persistence of the response suggests that a term
premium shock has long-term consequences for financial stability. The increase in long-term
rates following higher perceived risk, brings about a clear redistribution e ect between private
and government debt, with private loans decreasing as loan rates go up (rb
t
ø) and government
debt-to-GDP ratio increasing (as rl
t
ø). In an environment with higher financial uncertainty,
private lending rates increase, making it less attractive for borrowers to take out loans, which
further contributes to a decline in private debt as credit availability becomes constrained.
Overall, the results of the theoretical model are in line with the previous literature on
uncertainty shocks (e.g. Leduc and Liu, 2016) in that the term premium shock seems to
correspond with a demand shock. Unlike the literature on uncertainty shocks, we do not have
to assume persistent shocks to the second moment of TFP to model uncertainty. Instead, we
can use a level shock to the term premium to replicate exogenous events that increase investors’
14Jorda et al. (2017) find that the loan/deposit ratio is a better predictor for financial fragility than other
measures (i.e. capital/asset ratios).
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long-term risk expectations. The macroeconomic responses to the term premium shock are also
consistent with recent findings in the finance literature, in which Joslin et al. (2014) find that
both economic activity and inflation significantly decline when a canonical term structure model
of interest rates incorporates macroeconomic fundamentals beyond the information spanned by
the yield curve. Although not a general equilibrium framework, their model allows bond prices
to be influenced by yield curve factors as well as macroeconomic risks, which in turn account for
variation in the term premium. Finally, the DSGE model responses to a term premium shock
confirm and refine the findings in our empirical section, which predict that a risk shock lowers
output, short-term rates, and loans, and has a more muted e ect on prices.
Figure 3.4: Impulse Responses to a Term Premium Shock
Quarters


























































































































































Notes: The blue line represents the impulse responses from the theoretical DSGE model using the
baseline calibration. The shock is a 10 basis point shock to the term premium.
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3.5.1 Monetary Policy and Other Macroeconomic Shocks
Next, we analyse the impulse responses of traditional macroeconomic shocks as well as their
e ect on the term premium. The responses to a positive, one standard deviation technology,
government spending, and monetary policy shocks are reported in Figure 3.5. The left column
shows the results for a technology shock, which can also be interpreted as a supply-side shock.
As is standard in the literature, a technology shock increases output and lowers inflation and
the short-term interest rate. Consistent with the findings outlined in Rudebusch et al. (2007), a
technology shock reveals a negative relationship between output and the term premium, which
declines as a result of stronger economic activity associated with higher productivity.
In the middle panel, a government spending shock that represents a shock on the demand
side, raises both output and inflation, together with the short-term interest rate and the term
premium. As in the case of Rudebusch et al. (2007), an increase in government debt that
induces output growth, yields a higher term-premium, all else equal. The mechanism behind
this result works through the bond-supply channel: As the government increases the supply of
long-term bonds to finance higher spending, bond prices go down and bond yields go up, while
the risk-neutral yields remain constant, thus increasing the term premium.
The right-hand-side column shows the responses to a positive monetary policy shock, i.e. an
increase in the short-term rate. A contractionary monetary policy shock induces less persistent
responses and implies, as expected, a decrease in output and inflation. As in Rudebusch et al.
(2007) and Rudebusch and Swanson (2012), the term premium increases in response to tighter
monetary policy conditions. The intuition behind the increase in the term premium is that
tighter monetary policy often leads to increases in risk aversion, so that investors demand a
higher compensation to hold long-term bonds.15
15Mallick et al. (2017) investigate the role of monetary policy shocks on the term premium, where pre-2008
they use the Federal funds rate as the main monetary policy instrument and post-2008 they instead use Fed asset
purchases and three-month Federal funds futures. Both empirical identification strategies of monetary policy
shocks lead to statistically significant e ects on the term premium, although through di erent mechanisms.
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Figure 3.5: Impulse Responses to Classic Macroeconomic Shocks

















































































































Notes: The blue line represents the impulse responses from the theoretical DSGE model using the
baseline calibration. The shock size is a positive one standard deviation shock to the corresponding
macroeconomic variable. The y-axis represents percentage deviation from steady state with the
exception of the interest rate and the term premium, which are presented in quarterly percentage and
basis points, respectively. The x-axis indicates quarters.
We analyse the interaction of monetary policy and the term premium more closely by
considering the e ects of an expansionary monetary policy shock. There has been a large debate
on the e ects of monetary policy on financial stability, particularly in the aftermath of the
Global Financial Crisis (e.g., Adrian and Liang, 2016). The key problem lies with the risk-return
tradeo  between financial stability and general macroeconomic conditions. While low interest
rates help to increase the amount of loans and often coincide with a lowering of the term premium
–which boosts banks’ profits and investment in the short-term–, they also lead to the build-up of
risky leverage in the long run (also see Dell’ariccia et al., 2017). This holds particularly true
during times when interest rates are already at low levels (Coimbra and Rey, 2017). Our model
provides the mechanisms for which this idea can be rationalised in a general equilibrium context
in Figure 3.6, showing the e ects of an expansionary monetary policy shock. An expansion in
monetary policy does indeed lead to a decrease in the term premium and an increase in loans
given out to entrepreneurs. The loan/deposit ratio of banks drops initially, as banks are making
more profit to invest in bank capital (JB
t
ø), before increasing significantly due to the increase in
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the amount of loans (bl
t
ø) and the decline in household savings following the lower return on
deposits (d
t
¿). With banks having less deposits to back up their loans, this suggests a worsening
of financial stability. Our model suggests that it takes 25 years for banks to converge back to
their steady state levels. This would indeed imply that especially a prolonged period of monetary
easing could contribute to a positive short-term reduction in the term premium and an increase
in investment and loans, at the cost of a slow decline in financial stability as measured by the
loan/deposit ratio.16 We can conclude that our model manages to capture a) both the basic
macroeconomic dynamics, as well as the term premium moments, and b) the e ects of long-term
risk shocks. Unlike previous studies, we achieve these desirable properties without having to
increase the CRRA to extraordinary high levels, or having to make any specific assumptions
on the type of uncertainty that feeds into households’ consumption decisions and how it might
a ect the macroeconomy. We also show that accommodative monetary policy can indeed lead
to a reduction in the term premium in the short run, but also have implications for long-term
financial stability.
Figure 3.6: Expansionary Monetary Policy Shock
Quarters














































Notes: The blue line represents the impulse responses from the theoretical DSGE model using the
baseline calibration. The shock represents a one standard deviation decrease in the short-term policy
rate.
3.5.2 Macroprudential Policy
Given our proposed framework, we investigate di erent policy actions to deal with an exogenous
increase in long-term risk that has destabilising e ects in the financial sector. As we have seen in
the previous section, even a small term premium shock can have large and long-lasting e ects on
the macroeconomy. The reduction in private loans that follows a term premium shock contributes
16It should be noted that our model assumes that loans are not risky and that the premium on loan rates
arises due to market power of retail banks rather than endogenous default risk of borrowers. While our model
implies that the ratio is capital over non-risky assets, it can be seen as a short-cut for capital/risky assets due to
the premium paid on private sector loans, and as such can be seen as a measure of financial vulnerabilities.
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to a large and persistent fall in investment. We shall test two specific types of macroprudential
policies that the monetary policy authority can implement in order to make the economy more
resilient to increases in long-term risk: Macroprudential Policy A (MP-A) relays on increasing
banks’ required capital/asset ratio, ‹; Macroprudential Policy B (MP-B) decreases the steady
state of the LTV ratio of entrepreneurs, mE,SS
t
. We assume a doubling of the capital/asset ratio
from 0.09 to 0.18, so that banks are encouraged to have a larger capital bu er with respect to
their assets. The LTV target ratio for entrepreneurs decreases from 0.35 to 0.25 implying that
entrepreneurs need to back up the same quantity of loans with more collateral than before. Both
measures are intended to make the financial system more resilient to risk shocks. Figure 3.7
reports the results for the two macroprudential policies relative to the baseline scenario from the
previous section.
MP-A, the increase in the capital/asset ratio, does not seem to improve general macroeconomic
conditions, as output, investment and private debt are projected to fall as much as in the baseline
scenario. However, the severity of the decline in consumption is mitigated by this policy. Most
importantly, the increase in the loans/deposit ratio is substantially lower, indicating that it is
indeed a very e ective measure to safeguard financial stability as a term premium shock hits
the economy. In contrast, MP-B, the reduction in the LTV target ratio, has consistent positive
e ects on all variables. The severity of the negative responses is reduced for all macroeconomic
variables, and in particular prevents a large decline in private debt and investment. It also
reduces the loan/deposit ratio, albeit less than MP-A. While MP-A stabilises the economy
by reducing loans even further during a risk shock, MP-B e ectively mitigates the negative
impact of a term premium shock on investment. This counterfactual experiment provides a clear
indication that stricter LTV target ratios can help to safeguard the economy from some of the
negative consequences of an unanticipated risk shock, whereas higher capital/asset ratios are
more e ective at directly tackling financial instability. The latter can still be costly, as banks
might be incentivised to reduce the number of loans they give to borrowers to meet the higher
capital target, which in turn reduces investment in the economy even further. These results are
consistent with Altunbas et al. (2017) , who find evidence suggesting that macroprudential tools
have a significant impact on bank risk.17 Overall, we can conclude that the destabilising e ects
of monetary policy rules that target output and price stability can be at least partially o set by
macroprudential policies designed to provide financial stability during times of distress.18
17Refer to Claessens (2015) for an overview on the impact of di erent macruprudential policies.
18Note that our model does not take into account bank failures, which might occur for extreme risk events. In
those cases a capital/asset ratio would potentially provide enough bu er to avoid bank failure and thus have very
large e ects on financial stability.
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Figure 3.7: Impulse Responses of a Term Premium Shock under Di erent Policy Scenarios
Quarters


























































































































































Notes: The blue line represents the impulse responses from the theoretical DSGE model using the
baseline calibration. The red dotted line represents scenario under MP-A, a higher capital/asset ratio,
whereas the blue dashed line corresponds to scenario under MP-B, a lower LTV ratio. The shock is a
60 basis point shock to the term premium.
3.6 Conclusion
We have shown that a term premium shock can be a good measurement for the e ects of long-term
uncertainty/risk shocks. Both empirically, as well as in a DSGE model, term premium shocks
have real macroeconomic consequences and can a ect lending conditions in the financial sector.
We construct a model with time-varying term premia, which allows us to match both macro and
finance moments without having to assume extreme values for the CRRA coe cient. Our model
confirms that risk shocks reduce the volume of private loans in favour of government bonds
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temporarily and lead to a more persistent decline in the loan/deposit ratio of banks indicating a
potential threat to financial stability. In real terms, the negative financial consequences translate
into a decline in investment, as well as consumption and output. We have also provided evidence
for two policy hypotheses: a) the assumption that accommodative monetary policy reduces
risk premia and increases short-term lending, at the cost of increased risk in the long-term, as
shown by a decline in the capital/asset ratio of banks, and b) that macroprudential policies,
and in particular stricter LTV ratios for borrowers, can help to mitigate some of the negative
consequences of risk shocks.
There are many avenues in which the model can be extended. In terms of the banking sector,
one useful addition to make the model more realistic would be to allow for private loans to
default endogenously. This would endogenise the premium that is charged on top of private loans
based on the relative riskiness of private debt over government debt. Another useful extension
would be to introduce a proper government sector that can tax and subsidise households, as
this might reduce the supply for long-term government debt, and help to match the volatility
of investment more realistically. Finally, an interesting avenue to pursue would be to estimate
the model formally. Especially, the household parameters, which are crucial to pin down both
the macroeconomic, as well as asset price behaviour, would benefit from an estimation rather
than an informal calibration. As methods that allow to estimate a model to the third order (see
e.g. Andreasen et al., 2013) are still di cult to implement for high-dimensional models, we shall
leave this for future investigation.
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3.A.1 Term Premium, Unemployment and Uncertainty Indicators
• The term premium is the ten-year Treasury average term premium from the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York, developed by Tobias Adrian, Richard Crump, and Emanuel
Moench, which can be downloaded at https://www.newyorkfed.org/research/data_
indicators/term_premia.html. For details on the methodology refer to Adrian et al.
(2013). Data from January 1961 to May 1961 are extended back using the growth rate of
the ten-year Treasury note yield at constant maturity from the Federal Reserve Board.
• The civilian unemployment rate for individuals 16 years of age and older is seasonally
adjusted and obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
• The monthly economic policy uncertainty index was developed by Scott Baker and Nicholas
Bloom of Stanford University and Steven Davis of the University of Chicago. For more
details refer to Baker et al. (2016). Inflation Uncertainty and Economic Policy Uncertainty
are proxied by the dispersion in the consumer price index, purchase of goods and services by
state and local governments, and purchases of goods and services by the federal government.
• Financial Uncertainty is proxied by the Merrill lynch Option Volatility Estimate (MOVE)
Index, which is a yield curve weighted index of the normalised implied volatility on
one-month Treasury options which are weighted on the 2, 5, 10, and 30 year contracts.
124
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3.A.2 Empirical Section: Term Premium and Macroeconomic Vari-
ables
Monthly from 1961-M01 to 2016-M12, expressed in annual terms.
• Output is the seasonally adjusted annual log change of the industrial production index
(2012=100) from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
• Inflation is the annual percentage change in the U.S. Consumer Price Index (SA, 1982-
84=100) from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
• The nominal shadow short-term interest rate is computed as the average discount rate from
1961-M01 to 1961-M12; the end-of-period discount rate from the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York from 1962-M01 to 1982-M06; the Federal Funds Target rate from 1982-M07 to
2008-M12 and from 2015-M10 to 2016-M12; and the Wu-Xia shadow Federal Funds rate
from 2009-M01 to 2015-M09.
• Loans is the annualised log growth of end-of-period loans and leases in bank credit for all
commercial banks (SA, Bil.$).
• The junk-bond spread is the Moody’s seasoned Baa corporate bond yield (% p.a.) minus
the ten-year Treasury note yield at constant maturity (% p.a.) from the Federal Reserve
Board.
• The Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index (VIX) from Bloomberg, 1990–2017,
reflects a market estimate of future volatility, based on the weighted average of the implied
volatilities for a wide range of strikes. 1st & 2nd month expirations are used until 8 days
from expiration, then the 2nd and 3rd are used.
3.A.3 DSGE Model: Macroeconomic and Financial Data
Quarterly from 1961-Q1 to 2016-Q4, expressed in annual terms.
1. Consumption*. Real personal consumption is computed as the period-to-period log growth
rates of real expenditures of non-durable goods and services (SAAR, Bil.$), averaged using
their shares in nominal expenditures. The weighted average growth rate is applied to
the sum of nominal expenditures in both categories in 1961-Q1 to produce chained real
consumption with a base of 1961-Q1.
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2. Investment*. Annualised log growth of the private domestic investment component of
chained real GDP is SSAR, Chn.2009$.
3. Labour*. Total hours of production per worker is computed as the amount of aggregate
weekly hours of total private production and non-supervisory employees (SA, Thous.),
multiplied by the number of weeks in the quarter to produce quarterly hours of labor. Since
the data start in 1964-Q1, business sector compensation per hour (SA) from the Bureau of
Labor Statistics is used to extend the series backwards to the start of the dataset.
4. Inflation. Inflation is annualised log growth rate of the chain price index of GDP.
5. Output*. Seasonally adjusted annual log growth rate of chained real GDP.
6. Short Rate. The short-term nominal interest rate is computed as the average discount rate
from 1961-Q1 to 1961-Q4; the end-of-period discount rate at Federal Reserve Bank of New
York from 1962-Q1 to 1982-Q2; the Federal Funds target rate from 1982-Q3 to 2008-Q4
and 2015-Q4 to 2016-Q4; and the Wu-Xia shadow Federal Funds rate from 2009-Q1 to
2015-Q3.
7. Loans*. Annualised log growth of end-of-period loans and leases in bank credit for all
commercial banks (SA, Bil.$).
* HP filtered to extract the cyclical component.
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Table 3.A.1: Data Sources and Summary Statistics (1961-2016)




Consumption 224 0.00 0.85 ≠2.00 2.92 Bureau of Economic Analysis
I
t
Investment 224 0.00 4.08 ≠12.62 9.50 FRB St. Louis
l
t
Labour 224 0.00 2.10 ≠6.71 4.71 Bureau of Labor Statistics
fi
t
Inflation 224 3.42 2.45 ≠0.62 12.77 Bureau of Economic Analysis
Y
t
















Output 672 1.41 3.85 ≠15.89 7.44 FRB St. Louis
fi
t
Inflation 672 3.85 2.89 ≠1.96 14.59 Bureau of Labor Statistics
i
t
Short Rate 672 4.77 3.49 ≠2.99 14.00 FRB, FRB Atlanta
b
t
Loans 672 7.80 4.53 ≠9.40 20.30 Federal Reserve Board
tp
t
Term Premium 672 1.64 1.19 ≠0.65 4.79 Federal Reserve Board
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Figure 3.B.1: Impulse Responses Excluding Financial Crisis (left) and Great Moderation Only
(right)
Notes: The shaded regions report point-wise 68% Monte Carlo credible sets. The solid line shows the
median response to a one standard deviation shock to the term premium.
129
Chapter 3. Financial Stability and the Term Premium
Figure 3.B.2: Impulse Responses to a Contractionary Monetary Policy Shock
Notes: The shaded regions report point-wise 68% Monte Carlo credible sets. The solid line shows the
median response to a one standard deviation shock to the shadow interest rate.
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Empirical Robustness
Figure 3.B.3: Impulse Responses to a VIX Shock
Notes: The shaded regions report point-wise 68% Monte Carlo credible sets. The solid line shows the
median response to a one standard deviation shock to the VIX.
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3.C Model Parameter Sensitivity
Figure 3.C.1: Responses to a Term Premium Shock under di erent Parameterisation
Quarters






















































































































































α = 0.25 α
EZ
 = -0.1 α
EZ
 = -10 IES=0.5 IES=0.8 φ
π
=3 Baseline
Notes: The blue line represents the impulse responses from the theoretical DSGE model using the
baseline calibration. The shock is a 10 basis point shock to the term premium. The dotted and slash
lines represent the median response under di erent parameterisation as specified in the legend.
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